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ABSTRACT
MENTAL ACCOUNTING PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE CYCLE ECONOMICS:
WHO SAVES, WHO DOESN’T AND HOW TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE
by
Thomas James Van De Water 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2004 
Wealth is often associated with status purchases or belonging to a demographic group 
instead of a cognitive decision process for saving and accumulating wealth. Mental accounting 
psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) and life cycle economics 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) describe two different saving processes. Qualitative interviews 
in Study I (adult heads of household, n=24) and a quantitative analysis in Study 2 (2001 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, n=4,332) compared high and low saving people using mental accounting 
and life cycle variables. Interviews in Study 1 predominantly described saving in terms of short­
term, mental accounting heuristics that separated assets and provided self-control for spending. 
Participants did not report a life-cycle saving process that pooled assets, rationally allocated 
wealth over time or set a long-term, optimal spending level. Study 2 also supported mental 
accounting indicating high and low net worth individuals differed in the number of separate asset 
accounts, debt aversion and expertise in converting income into less liquid current and future 
assets. These findings point toward an expanded role for mental accounting in interdisciplinary 
research, financial education, and national saving programs.
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INTRODUCTION
The American success story has become the American excess story. A pervasive 
“you are what you buy” consumerism (Dittmar, 1992; Lunt & Livingstone, 1992; Schor, 
1998; Wolkomir & Wolkomir, 2002) has contributed to unprecedented household debt 
and bankruptcies (Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 2000). Yet, there are some who live 
below their means and save. For example, Mary Hutto, a teacher, lived frugally and slept 
in the hallway of her student boarding house so all the rooms would have tenants. Raised 
during the Depression and never earning a high income, she saved and invested, 
believing she would not have enough on which to live. She donated $3.5 million to fund a 
scholarship at her alma mater (Portsmouth Herald, September 28, 2001). In a culture that 
champions spending, why are these people different? What characteristics identify and 
distinguish those with a propensity to save and accumulate wealth versus those who do 
not?
This research examines characteristics that separate people into meaningful 
groups with different levels of saving. First, economic and psychological literature 
related to decision making and saving will be reviewed. Next, two studies will be 
presented. The first was a qualitative study that explored a select group of individuals’ 
experiences, approaches and rationales for saving. The second was a quantitative 
secondary analysis of the Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances that 
examined which variables separated those who saved from those who did not.
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CHAPTER I
SAVING DECISIONS:
MENTAL-ACCOUNTING PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE-CYCLE ECONOMICS
Social scientists have developed models to describe and predict saving decisions. 
Traditionally, studies on saving were conducted by economists. Saving research has 
recently become more interdisciplinary. While most saving research has been based on 
economic theory, psyehological concepts, theories and methods have been applied more 
widely. The overall movement in both decision-making and saving models has been that 
an individual’s decision to save is increasingly viewed as subjective and strongly 
influenced by psychological factors.
Economists have conceptualized discretionary personal saving as a life-cycle 
function of fungible wealth and age (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). Over the bell­
shaped age-income profile, people pool ineome, assets and future income and set 
eonsumption to a permanent income across periods (Friedman, 1957). The young borrow, 
the middle-aged save, and the elderly dissave. Rothschild (1991) paraphrased the 
economic view as, “savings are ways o f purchasing future consumption” (p. 128). This 
approach deductively prescribes saving decisions for a rational individual who optimizes 
personal utility according to demographic characteristics (age, income), external 
constraints (interest rate, ability to borrow) and objective standards (outcome probability, 
dollar value). It is a normative account of how people should behave. There is
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considerable evidence for aggregate life-cycle relations between age and income groups 
(Modigliani, 1985). In cross-sectional and panel data, saving levels are lowest among 
youth, highest among the middle aged and decreasingly smaller for elderly cohorts (e.g., 
Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Deaton, 1992).
Life-cycle economics have not accounted for all of the variation in saving, 
though. Unexplained variation still exists within matched age and wealth cohorts (e.g., 
Kennickell 1995; Venti & Wise, 1991). People with similar demographic characteristics 
(age, income, families, etc.) often save drastically different amounts. It is also not clear 
that people consciously and rationally solve a complex, multi-period optimization 
problem to alloeate their spending (Thaler, 1995). Saving decisions involve additional 
psychological factors (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, memory, recall) and subjective information 
processing prone to heuristics, biases and irrationality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Thaler, 1990).
Social-cognitive psychology is based largely within an information-processing 
paradigm (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Simon, 1982). This approach describes psychological 
processes inductively with empirical experiments. The psychological approach assumes 
neither rationality nor optimization (Ajzen, 1996). It is a descriptive account of how 
people actually behave. According to the psychological approach, saving decisions 
undergo cognitive framing as a gain/loss from a subjective reference point (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, 2000) and mental accounting across age and wealth levels (Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1988). Saving decisions are influenced by topical cognitive representations 
susceptible to framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). How a decision is 
described and represented directs it to a mental account (Thaler, 1985). This can occur by
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a budgeting process (establishing consumption categories like food, rent, etc.), location of 
the funds (checking, saving, pension) or source of income (regular or windfall). Three 
mental accounts have been proposed with different marginal propensities for 
consumption (MFC): current income (MPC=1), assets (0<MPC<1) and future income 
(MPC=0). Saving occurs if the choice is framed and directed to accounts with a low 
propensity for consumption (Thaler, 1999). In other words, people control spending by 
separating assets and using heuristics.
Subjectivity has increased in both the decision-making and saving literatures. 
Saving models have moved from measuring saving economics with objective 
demographic variables toward measuring saving psychology with subjective variables. 
Empirical research has generally shown; (a) people tend not to rationally weigh all 
options and select only optimally beneficial choices; rationality is bounded (Simon,
1982), (b) people minimize cognitive effort by using heuristics prone to error 
(Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982), and (c) people often arrange wealth into separate 
mental accounts to provide self-control and simplify financial decisions and the mental 
account balances frame subsequent decisions to spend or save (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).
In other words, as saving decisions become more relative, psychology becomes more 
relevant.
Models o f  Decision Making: Increasingly Subjective
The movement from objective demographic measures to subjeetive psychological 
measures can be seen in the evolution of mathematical models of decision-making. The 
original models of decision-making under risk (probabilities o f success are known or 
estimated) and uncertainty (probability o f success is unknown) arose from
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mathematicians who studied games of chance (Gigerenzer et ah, 1993). A model was 
constructed with assumptions to define and predict how an individual would act and new 
models evolved due to unexplained anomalies of the current theory. Today’s models have 
roots in the 17‘^  century. Building on the legal tradition of contracts, mathematicians 
questioned what constituted a fair exchange or contract to wager on an uncertain 
outcome. Christiann Huygens proposed in the mid 1600s that a fair game was 
characterized as a game in which the expectations would work to no one’s disadvantage. 
Expectation, then translated into a fair price to play given an outcome with a certain 
probability o f occurring (Gigerenzer et ah, 1993). This concept was later represented 
mathematically as:
E=p(e)V E =Expectation
p(e) =Probability of event
V =Outcome value
This representation was extended into Expected Value theory (EY) which 
proposed that the expectation of a monetary gamble was a weighted average and each 
possible outcome was weighted by the probability of its occurrence (Gigerenzer et al., 
1993). For example, given a lottery with 1,000 tickets and a $10,000 prize, what is the 
fair price (expectation) to play this lottery? According to EV, the expectation would be 
E=p(e)Vwin + E=p(e)all losses. In this case, there is one winner among 1,000 entries 
making the probability o f winning 1/1,000 and the value of the outcome is $10,000. The 
other 999 entries will lose with a probability o f 999/1,000 and the value o f this outcome 
is $0. When the formula E=p(e)Y is applied to the win outcome the expectation equals 
$10, and when applied to all the loss outcomes the expectation is zero. Therefore, when
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all the expectations for all possible outcomes (both losses and wins) were summed the 
total expectation to play this lottery was $10 (Gigerenzer, et al. 1993; Lopes, 1994).
Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 observed that the value of money was relative to the 
individual, and be conceived of the subjective value of money as utility (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1993). For example, a millionaire might view a potential gain o f $1,000 as 
inconsequential whereas a poor person might view a $1,000 gain as a windfall. Bernoulli 
also thought that the reason behind people’s risk aversion might lie in the subjective 
evaluation o f money or utility. To describe utility mathematically, Bernoulli proposed 
that utility could be characterized by a concave, logarithmic function. The effect of this 
logarithmic function was that it compressed higher values, so that money has a 
diminishing marginal utility (i.e., differences between larger values have less impact than 
the same differences for smaller values). For example, the difference in utility between 
$200 and $100 is greater than the difference in utility between $1,200 and $1,100. 
People’s preferences between gambles could then be described in terms of the gamble’s 
expected utility. Expected utility theory (EU) also described why people were risk averse 
for a probabilistic outcome with a higher objective outcome value because this value had 
less utility. For example, in the previously mentioned choice between gambles with an 
.85 chance to win $1,000 versus a 100% chance to win $800, the $800 would have a 
higher utility than the $1,000 due to the logarithmic function (Gigerenzer, et al. 1993, 
Lopes, 1994).
Expected utility theory was extended by Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
mathematical axioms in their 1947 hook, Theorv o f Games and Economic Behavior. The 
title illustrates extensions beyond games of chance into wider economic decisions. These
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authors assumed a rational decision-maker whose choices among risky gambles would 
consistently follow normative axioms. Von Neumann and Morgenstem (1947) proposed 
that preferences could be summarized by the concave utility function o f money that 
Bernoulli described, and that these preferences could be modeled as if  the person always 
chose to maximize expected utility. One axiom that was proposed was invariance. 
Invariance prescribes that the preference order among gambles should not depend upon 
how they are described, or variations in the problem’s form that do not affect the final 
outcome should not affect choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). For example, when asked to choose the greater term when the problem was 
described as A>B or when the problem was described as B<A, the rational decision 
maker who seeks to maximize utility follows the invariance axiom and chooses A in both 
eases.
An implication of this treatment of EU was that if  people seek to maximize utility, 
then their preferences should be linear to the outcome probabilities. In other words, 
people should always prefer the highest probability option. This assumption of linearity 
mandates both a constant difference (a difference in probabilities translates into an 
equivalent difference in subjective utility) and a constant ratio (the ratio o f probability 
and utility are one to one). However, in the 1950s Maurice Allais proposed a set of 
paradoxical situations that countered these assumptions. Allais’ paradoxes essentially 
observed that preferences were not linear with probability. He observed that people prefer 
certain things disproportionately to outcomes with a very high probability (e.g., 100% vs. 
90% chance), and that people preferred more impossible things if it appeared to improve 
the outcome (e.g., .001 chance for $1 million vs. .01 chance for $50) (Lopes, 1994).
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) experimentally demonstrated that people did not 
follow the invariance axiom in their choices. They discovered that if  a problem was 
described as a gain or a loss, it differentially affected or framed people’s subsequent 
choices. For example, this was seen in the following problems from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) where the percentage of people choosing the option is in brackets:
Win frame A. +$3,000 p=.90 [86%] Lose frame A. -$3,000 p=.90 [8%]
B. +$6,000 p=.45 [14%] B. -$6,000 p=.45 [92%]
In the win frame, this pattern of preferences demonstrated risk aversion away from the 
higher-value, lower-probability outcome. However, in the lose frame, there was an 
opposite pattern for risk seeking to prefer the higher-value, lower-probability outcome. 
These counter examples to EU illustrated that EU focused on describing the outputs of 
risky choices and did not explain a psychological process underlying these choices.
In contrast. Prospect theory (FT) proposed a psyehological process underlying 
both violations of linearity and invariance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A prospect is a 
contract that yields outcome X with probability P, and is denoted as (x, p). To describe 
the psychological process underlying decision making, Kahneman and Tversky proposed 
that there were two phases in choosing among risky prospects. The first stage was termed 
editing or framing and consisted of encoding information as a gain or loss from the 
current status quo or reference point. The second stage was known as evaluation, and it 
occurred when the edited prospects were examined and the one with the highest value 
was selected.
A central tenet of PT was that individuals evaluated risky decisions from a 
relative reference point, and that the subjective value of the outcome was described as an 
S-shaped function around the reference point. Based upon people’s preferences in
8
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experiments, Kahneman and Tversky proposed a hypothetical value function that was 
concave for gains (v”(x)<0, for x > 0) and convex for losses (v”(x)>0, for x < 0) and that 
it was steeper for losses than for gains. The origin was the referenee point and there was 
diminishing sensitivity to differences farther away from the reference point. An 
implication of this new approach was that people are loss averse. Because the value 
function was steeper for losses than for gains, it implied that a loss of $10 was more 
aversive than a gain of $10 was attractive.
Another tenet of prospect theory was that probability perceptions are subjective 
and described by a non-linear transformation of objective probabilities using the decision 
weight 71. The decision weight was described as an increasing function of probability 
such that: if  p=0, then 7i (p)=0 and if p= l, then n (p)=l. The discontinuities of n at the 
endpoints demonstrated there was a limit to how small a decision weight could be 
attached to an event, so 7t was not well behaved at the endpoints. As a result o f the non­
linear decision weights, there was a category boundary effect at the probability endpoints 
(i.e., certain events 95-100%, and improbable events 0-5%):
In this way, PT predicted certain behaviors (risk aversion or risk seeking) as a 
function of how the problem was described. Descriptions of the problem in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1986) experiments varied the outcome and whether the problem was 
phrased as a loss or a gain. For example, students were asked to indicate which o f two 
medical treatments for lung cancer they preferred in choice problems. Preferences 
changed by manipulating a problem’s wording as a gain or loss, “The advantage of 
radiation therapy over surgery evidently looms larger when stated as a reduction of the 
risk of immediate death from 10% to 0% rather that as an increase from 90% to 100% in
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the rate of survival” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, S255). This problem illustrated the 
loss aversion predicted by PT’s value function as well as the shift in preferences 
predicted by non-linear decision weight transformations of probability at the endpoints. 
Formally, PT for a choice between two prospects is stated as:
V(x,p : y,q) = n (p) v(x) + n (q) v(y)
V = overall value of prospect
(x,p : y,q) = x with probability p and y with probability q
v = subjective value of particular outcome
n = decision weight
In informal terms, PT shifted the mathematical expression of decision making toward 
greater dependency on the subjective value as a gain or loss.
Overall, models o f decision-making under risk and uncertainty have become 
increasingly relative over time by adding subjective value terms. Expected value (EV) 
with the addition o f a subjective valuation o f money became expected utility (EU). 
Expected Utility then led to prospect theory (PT) with a subjective probability term and 
valuation from a relative reference point as a gain or loss.
Economic Models o f  Saving
Similar to decision making, saving research has incorporated more subjective 
elements into theory. Early analytic descriptions o f saving have a strong psychological 
trait flavor (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). Saving is described as a function of personality 
(Fisher, 1930), motivation / habit (Keynes, 1936), and social-comparison (Duesenberry, 
1949). However, these factors are not incorporated into formal models. Macroeconomic 
accounts of saving arise from a consumption function. Browning and Lusardi (1996) 
observe, “Although the theory is sophisticated and flexible, it is a theory o f consumption;
10
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saving is simply the residual between income and current consumption” and that “most of 
the empirical work on saving itself is descriptive and relatively atheoretical.” (p. 1798). 
More recent models of saving have not only cited the influence of psychological factors, 
but also included these factors in saving decision models.
Fisher (1930) stated saving requires foresight, self-control, habits, expectation of 
life and desire to leave things for posterity. Saving is a multi-period exercise that requires 
rational decisions, planning for the future and developing good habits (Mayer, 1972). 
Fisher’s (1930) consumption function can be summarized as:
C = C(Y,r)
C = consumption 
Y = annual income 
r = interest
Thus, consumption was a function o f income and interest. Savings (S) were uneonsumed 
annual income or S = Y -  C. However, saving was dynamic and a central assumption was 
positive time preference, meaning that the value derived from future consumption was 
less than the same consumption now. Household saving as a result requires intertemporal 
optimization o f consumption. The household could lend some of its present income to 
increase future consumption or borrow from its future income to increase present 
consumption. By limiting consumption today, households received it back with interest 
later so that future income was an endowment of Y -i- (K r)S . Borrowing from the future 
negated saving (-S). In a simple two-period model, the intertemporal optimization 
problem was:
max U(Ci, C2 ) 
s.t.
11
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C, +C 2/(l+r)< Yi +Y 2/(l+r)
U = expected utility 
Cx= consumption in period x 
Yx= endowment in period x 
Within this framework, the rational decision maker was constrained to ensure the 
present value of consumption streams did not exceed the present value o f income streams 
discounted at the rate of interest 1+r. Saving theories must also explain why people did 
not save. For Fisher, low-income households did not save because the pressure of 
supplying current wants overwhelmed concern for the future. The desirability o f present 
consumption relative to the future was greater than the lost interest. The gain from saving 
(or loss from not saving) was the interest rate and peoples’ choices illustrated their time 
preference.
Keynes (1936) proposed a series of motives for saving. These motives included: 
creating reserves for unplanned events (precautionary), creating reserves for planned 
future needs (life-cycle), gaining interest (intertemporal substitution), gaining greater 
spending capacity (improvement), financial freedom/power to do things (independence), 
invest in business (enterprise), leave things to others (bequest) and pure miserliness 
(avarice). However, Keynes’ (1936) absolute income theory shifted the focus to current 
period consumption. This simple consumption function can be expressed:
C = Co + cY
Consumption increased with income, but not in equal proportion because o f habit 
persistence. People accustomed to a lower standard of living have consumption habits 
that persisted when their incomes improved creating savings. Savings were thereby a
12
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residual o f consumption (Mayer, 1972). Conversely, low-income households had no 
residuals from habitually spending available income.
Duesenberry (1949) proposed that consumption increased in step with rising 
income but people had difficulty reducing consumption equally when income fell:
C =  Co +  CiY +  C2Y“
Y”^  = maximum consumption achieved in the past
Duesenberry’s relative income theory also posited a social-comparison aspect to saving. 
Personal consumption was influenced by comparison to previous personal consumption 
and one’s neighbors. Low-income households had a higher propensity to consume and 
did not save as they emulated their higher income neighbors (Mayer, 1972). Overall, 
these models focused on income at a certain point in time and did not account for future 
income or other assets. Wealth models added these factors.
The wealth models of saving were independently proposed by Nobel memorial 
prize laureates and included the life-cycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and 
permanent income (Friedman, 1957). Both theories adhered to the normative paradigm of 
a rational consumer optimizing utility within a set o f constraints. Breaking with the focus 
on current ineome, the life-cycle hypothesis and permanent income theory widened the 
perspective to wealth over time. The life-cycle hypothesis general claim was that when 
making consumption decisions, households looked beyond the current period and 
distributed eonsumption to maximize utility across a lifetime. Modigliani (1985) stated 
saving “could be accounted for in terms of rational, utility maximizing, consumers
13
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allocating their resources to consumption optimally over their life” and that “the size of 
saving over short periods of time, like a year, will be swayed by the extent to which 
current income departs from average life resources” (p.299). Modigliani’s (1985) simple 
consumption function was:
C = a Y L  + S W  
C = Consumption during a short-term period
a, S = Demographic parameters (length of life (age), retirement)
YL = Ineome
W = Wealth
In the life-cycle hypothesis, individuals rationally estimated future wealth to optimize 
spending. If income exceeded the long-term level of life resources (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954) or permanent income (Friedman, 1957), saving occurred. In aggregate, 
this consumption function can be represented:
Ct = cV,
Ct = consumption at time t
c = aggregate demographic characteristics
Vt= sum of assets, income and ail expected future earnings at time t
Current consumption was an annuity based on the present value o f current income, net 
assets and expeeted value of future income. Over the bell-shaped age-eamings profile, 
people smoothed eonsumption to a eonstant level. The allocation depended upon 
demographic characteristics (age, income, uncertainty, etc.). With financial markets, 
people shifted endowments over different time periods to smooth consumption while 
ineome varied. As the estimated future income stream rose, people would borrow. If
14
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expected future income was declining, people would save. This optimization problem 
could be stated as follows where time t spans t = 0 to t = T, the end of one's life:
maxU = Z t P ‘Ut(Ct) 
s.t.
S ,C t/( l-r ,)‘ <Ao + EtY ,/( l-r ,y
p * = subjective time discount rate 
Ao wealth at birth
A rational household allocated intertemporal consumption by the discounted value of its 
wealth (assets, current income and expected future income), the interest rate and its 
preference for present versus future consumption (Deaton, 1992; King, 1985; Mayer, 
1972). This was limited by an intertemporal budget constraint of all discounted future 
income and wealth.
Since Hall (1978), most empirical and theoretical saving research primarily has 
used the Euler equation for dynamic optimization and estimated the parameter for utility 
with the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) non-quadratic, iso-elastic utility 
function. Consumption was described as:
v(C, Z)
C = consumption
Z = vector of demographic factors that affect household utility 
The combined Euler equation and CRRA were stated in Browning and Lusardi (1996) as:
Ain Ct+]—P + aA Zt+i+ (|)rt-i- 0.5([)aVi+ P t+i 
y = coefficient of relative risk aversion
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(j) = subjective interest rate coefficient = 1/y (> 0 or positive to account for concavity)
P = subjective discount factor = (j)ln(p) 
a  = subjective changes in demographics factor = a(y -l)/y 
a^ t+i = subjective consumption shock variance 
and p t+i = - ( j )  ( e t + i  -  0.5( et+] -  a V i ) )
so that E t (p t+i) = 0
In this model there were an increased number o f terms and these terms were increasingly 
specific to the individual (i.e., subjective / relative). Personal risk aversion (y ) was added. 
The real interest rate was modulated by a person’s response to anticipations of interest 
( ( j ) ) .  Time discounting (P) or patience / impatience for consumption varied according to 
the individual. Anticipated changes in demographics (a) such as family size were 
subjective and had an independent effect. Consumption shock variances (cr t^+i) such as 
major medical expenses were factored into the model relative to the individual along with 
variance in the information available in time t (ct+i). The saving motives of Keynes could 
he ascribed to different terms. For example, the life cycle motive corresponded with 
changes in demographics (a), and precautionary and intertemporal substitution motives 
corresponded to expectations of interest rates (ijirt) (Browning and Lusardi, 1996).
Life-cyele theories carry a series of simplifying assumptions. Browning and 
Lusardi (1996) summarized these assumptions as the certainty equivalence model, 
“Agents have intertemporally additive utility functions and face perfect capital markets. 
Either there is perfect certainty or agents maximize expected utility; they form rational 
expectations and have quadratic utility functions” (p. 1801). These assumptions have
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empirical implications. A change in wealth (AW) should create a eorresponding 
proportional ehange in eonsumption. Substitutions in the category of wealth (current 
ineome, assets, or future income) should have no effect on consumption. Wealth is 
treated equally and interchangeably; i.e., wealth is fungible. Also, people should have the 
same marginal propensity to consume (MFC = proportion of incremental dollar spent 
versus saved) wealth from each category. The shape o f the lifetime consumption profile 
should be a constant proportion o f permanent income affeeted only by age, interest rates 
and family lifetime wealth. Life-cyele eonsumers possess strong self-control to modulate 
consumption to the permanent income level and consumption is valued equally during 
every period. With no bequest motive, eonsumers gear consumption to end life with zero 
wealth balanee. Consumer non-borrowing was due to external market liquidity 
eonstraints; i.e., lending institutions refuse loans. Finally, the consumer was assumed to 
be sophisticated and capable of solving a complex optimization problem (Thaler, 1990; 
Thaler, 1999). Recent models retain life-cyele elements, but relax the assumptions. 
Standard additive models assume uncertainty, imperfect capital markets and non­
quadratic utility functions to accommodate a precautionary motive, liquidity constraints, 
buffer stocks, habits, satiation and durable goods (Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Deaton, 
1999).
To summarize, macroeconomic consumption functions set different maximization 
problems for rational agents to save. These functions have grown more complex as terms 
were added to account for subjective factors people optimize in their decisions. Keynes’ 
(1936) reference for optimization was current income. Fisher (1930) referenced current 
income and the interest rate. Life cyele (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and permanent
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income (Friedman, 1957) agents reference current income, net assets, expeeted future 
income and subjective time discounting based on demographic characteristics. These 
factors have received the most attention in saving theories, and there is support for 
aggregate life-cyele allocation patterns in the general population. For example, 
KennickelFs (1995) examination of the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finance supported the 
life-cyele tenets of households smoothing consumption and declining savings with age. 
Tin (2000) observed that demographics were relevant for predicting levels of savings in 
financial institutions for transaction, precaution and speculation. Saving was strongly 
associated with wealth and the inequality in savings rates closely parallels wealth 
inequality (Kennickell, 2001). This pattern of age and income effects on saving was also 
supported by international research in Canada, Italy, Germany, Japan and the United 
Kingdom (Poterba, 1994). In sum, a voluminous literature supported age and income 
effects on saving (see Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Deaton, 1992). Life-cyele factors were 
robust indicators of a group’s economic capability to save.
However, Thaler (1992) wryly observed:
The modern theories of saving have made the representative consumer increasingly 
sophisticated. Expectations are taken to be the same as those which would be held 
by a sophisticated econometrician. The problem seems to be that while 
economists have gotten increasingly sophisticated and clever, consumers have 
remained decidedly human. This leaves open the question of whose behavior we 
are trying to model, (p. 121)
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1999) similarly noted:
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If all individuals were identical in all dimensions related to saving decisions 
(behavior, endowment, and restrictions they face), then aggregate saving would 
be trivially related to individual saving -  it would just equal the saving o f a 
representative agent multiplied by the population. To determine society’s total 
saving, it would suffice to know the values of the representative agent’s income, 
wealth, and so on. In other words, given the total population, aggregate saving 
would depend only on the aggregate values of variables such as income and 
wealth. If individuals are instead heterogeneous, however, this simple relationship 
ceases to hold. (p. 147)
Macroeconomic saving models have become more relative to the individual, their current 
state and their perception o f future states. In this evolution, the traditional assumptions of 
a homogeneous, rational agent and optimization have been questioned.
While there was strong support for aggregate life-cyele allocation patterns, the 
evidence does not strongly indicate individuals rationally optimize at the micro level 
according to the life-cyele model. Bemheim and Shoven (1991) note that despite many 
government programs aimed at increasing saving, saving rates have decreased steadily in 
the U.S. “The 1980s provided a humbling experience for economists and policy makers 
alike. Certainly we learned many lessons about the economy, but foremost among them 
was the realization that we still understand very little about the factors that motivate 
people to save.” (p. 2). There are strong cohort effects (Attanasio, 1994), gender effects 
(Hinz, McCarthy & Turner, 1997; Sunden & Surette, 1998), international differences in 
saving (Collins, 1991; Schmidt-Hebbel & Serven, 1999) and differences by education 
and race (Attanasio, 1994). An individual’s saving psyehology appears to reflect the
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processes o f perception, memory, information processing and choice. The next section 
reviews growing empirical support for psychological factors’ influence on saving 
deeisions.
Psychological Models o f  Saving
Similar to the decision-making literature, there are empirical anomalies for 
macroeconomic saving theories (Thaler, 1992). A ehange in wealth does not always 
create a corresponding change in consumption. Large lump-sum bonuses have a higher 
rate of saving versus small windfalls (Landsberger, 1966). The shape o f the lifetime 
consumption profile was not always a constant proportion of permanent income (Carroll 
& Summers, 1991). The retirement plans of the middle aged do not deerease savings in 
other areas. These are perceived and treated as illiquid and often prompt increased saving 
(Venti & Wise, 1987). The elderly do not dissave housing equity (Skinner, 1989; Venti & 
Wise, 1989). Consumers do not possess strong self-eontrol to modulate consumption 
(Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Consumption was shown to be hypersensitive to eurrent 
ineome (Hall & Mishkin, 1982; Wilcox, 1989) and most consumers do not have any 
discretionary saving (Attanasio, 1994; Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Surette, 2000; Venti 
& Wise, 1991). Furthermore, consumption appears not to be weighed equally during 
every period. The timing of income and payments affects consumption and saving 
choices (Prelec & Lowenstein, 1998). Self-imposed, internal rules to not finance 
consumption through debt (debt aversion) may provide a better description of consumer 
non-borrowing than liquidity constraints (Thaler, 1990). People often can borrow to 
finance consumption to a higher level, but do not. Finally, consumers may act as if  they 
are eapable o f solving complex optimization problems, but most do not. Anomalies such
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as the endowment effect’s underweighting of opportunity costs (Kahneman, Knetsch & 
Thaler, 1990; Thaler, 1980), myopic loss aversion (Bentarzi & Thaler, 1995), disposition 
effect (Odean, 1998) and the diversification heuristic (Thaler & Bentarzi, 2001) would 
not occur if  consumers rationally used decision algorithms (see also Thaler, 1992).
Prospect theory has been readily applied to economic anomalies (Camerer, 2000). 
Thaler (1980) integrated prospect theory into saving decisions:
we must consider the individual’s psychic accounting system. To do this it is 
necessary to introduce a psychic equivalent to debits and credits which for lack of 
better terms, I will call pleasure and pain. In terms of prospect theory, pleasure 
can be thought of as the value function in the domain of gains while pain 
corresponds to the value function in the domain of losses, (p. 278)
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) extended Thaler’s idea of a psychological account as an 
outcome frame specifying outcomes and how they were evaluated from a status quo 
reference point. It was re-termed as a mental account:
Our analysis of framing and of value can be extended to choices between 
multiattribute options, such as the acceptability o f a transaction or a trade. We 
propose that, in order to evaluate a multiattribute option, a person sets up a mental 
account that specifies the advantages and disadvantages associated with the 
option, relative to a multiattribute reference state. The overall value of an option 
is given by the balance of its advantages and its disadvantages in relation to the 
reference state. Thus, an option is acceptable if the value o f its advantages 
exceeds the value o f its disadvantages. This analysis assumes psychological - but 
not physical -  separability o f advantages and disadvantages. The model does not
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constrain the manner in which separate attributes are combined to form overall 
measures of advantage and of disadvantage, but it imposes on these measures 
assumptions of concavity and of loss aversion. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, pp. 
11- 12)
Thaler (1999a) expanded the term mental aceounting “to describe the entire process of 
coding, categorizing, and evaluating events” (p. 244). Beliefs and expectations were 
vulnerable to question formulation effects. This occurs during the editing or framing 
phase in prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) theorized that information was 
organized in a minimal aecount, a topieal account or a comprehensive account. A 
minimal account takes into consideration only the differences between options and not 
shared features. A topical account considers a reference state and the consequences o f the 
options on that reference state. Finally, a comprehensive account provides the widest 
context into which options are placed.
Ideally, people will rationally form a comprehensive account that treats an option 
as an example o f a larger class, gather data and compare the current option to the class 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993, Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984), however, claimed “people will spontaneously frame decisions in terms of topical 
accounts that, in the context of decision making, play a role analogous to that of ‘good 
forms’ in perception and of basic level categories in cognition” (p.347). Based on the 
topical account frame, people made subsequent evaluations as gains and losses from this 
reference point. Framing did not affect a minimal account nor a comprehensive account. 
In this way, the social context was cognitively translated through editing and evaluation 
to frame a deeision.
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To address saving anomalies, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) proposed an alternative 
approach to saving called the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis. The behavioral life-cycle 
hypothesis conceptualized a personality conflict between an emotional short-term doer 
and rational long-term planner. The temptation o f immediate consumption from the doer 
required conscious effort by the planner to resist. As a result, consumers adopted rules of 
thumb that decreased conscious effort. For example, an external self-control rule is a 
mandatory pension plan that precommits income and eliminates choices. Though not 
always optimal, these rules are simple, stable and allow few exceptions.
The behavioral-life cycle hypothesis drew from Kahneman and Tversky’s ideas 
on framing and mental accounts. Consumers divided wealth into mental accounts with 
differing marginal propensities to consume. The three accounts Shefrin and Thaler (1988) 
propose were: current income (MFC approximately 1), assets (1 > MFC > 0) and future 
income (MFC approximately 0). Mental accounts framed consumption decisions: “we 
assume that the temptation to spend a (marginal) dollar of wealth depends on the location 
o f that dollar in the mental accounting system, with current income being the most 
tempting, followed by current assets, and then future wealth” (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 
616). Once established, transactions are grouped and posted to these accounts. Feople 
coded external information about outcomes (hedonic framing) according to the value 
function of FT (e.g., segregating gains, integrating losses). Subsequently, the experienced 
outcome is actively edited (hedonic editing) from these entries (Thaler, 1999).
In formal terms, the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis defined self-control as the 
determining factor for saving. The utility to myopically consume immediately was
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countered by varying degrees of willpower (6t). Given an opportunity set X t, the level of 
consumption (c t) were a function of willpower (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).
0*t(ct ,XO 
0*t = willpower 
Ct = consumption 
Xt = opportunity set
Willpower decreased the utility of the doer’s consumption (Zt) and required energy to 
maintain over time. The eost of will power effort at the margin was:
8Zt/50t- 80*t/8ct
The net marginal cost of using will power (D) was the difference between a decrease in 
consumption utility with and without willpower:
D = (5Zt/50t • 50*t/5ct) - 6Zt/5ct > 0 
The behavioral life-cycle proposed a mental three aeeount system with a pension rule that 
deducts some proportion of ineome (s) for saving and references the balance of each 
account. The balances of the eurrent ineome, eurrent wealth (cumulative discretionary 
savings through period t - \ )  and future wealth accounts were defined by Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988) as:
Current income account = 1 = (1 -  5 )
s = proportion of income deducted for saving 
yt = income stream for period t
i -  1
Current wealth account = A = Z [(1 -  5 ) Jt- -  Cr]
T
Future wealth account = F = (future income -  pension withdrawals) +s(Z yi*)
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s(Eyi*) = pension wealth 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) stated that utility (Z,) is parameterized by the choice set 
(X,) of current income (I), current assets (A) and future income (F) account balances and 
that the relationship between utility, will power and consumption within a mental 
accounting structure can be graphed as Z,(c,, 0*t, Xt) against c , . Consumption from 
current income increased utility with diminishing returns as the balance reaches zero. 
When the first unit of the asset account was consumed there was an entry fee, or disutility 
penalty followed by a slow increase in utility as the asset account reaches zero. Future 
income accounts were the last to be accessed and incur an entry fee followed by the 
smallest increase in utility. For aggregate prediction, the behavioral life cycle 
consumption function was based on the three mental accounts:
C=f(l A, F)
The accounts were related according to the following inequality:
1~ 8C/S/ > 5C/5T > 5C/DF ~ 0 
The marginal propensity to consume the current income account was closest to 1 and 
greater than the current asset and future income account.
Compared to the economic saving literature, psychological saving research is 
limited in size and scope. Kahneman (2003) stated that for many academics, this research 
was viewed as “professional suicide”:
Although behavioral economics has enjoyed much more rapid progress and 
gained more respectability in economics than appeared possible 15 years ago, it is 
still a minority approach ... But many bright young [researchers] are now betting 
their careers on the expectation that the current trend will last for some time 
(Kahneman, 2003, 729).
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A sample o f empirical studies over two decades show framing and mental accounting 
affect saving. Pre-commitment devices such as 401k or IRA plans reduce self-control 
required to save and provide self-imposed rules that are simple, stable and allow few 
exceptions to segregate wealth and make it non-fungible (Gaerling, Karlsson & Selart, 
1999; Thaler, 1980, 1985, Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Accordingly, there has been 
considerable evidence that 401k and IRA plans represent new saving and not just 
reshuffling of assets (Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1994; Venti & Wise, 1991). Labeling a 
transaction and posting to a mental account can affect decisions. For example, the 
difference between cash and credit card prices are termed cash discount instead of credit 
card surcharge based on this principle (Thaler, 1980). Investments that are viewed as “in 
the red” (losers) are less likely to be sold than those “in the black” (winners) (Odean, 
1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985) when a rational approach would dictate the opposite. 
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) illustrated preference changes shifted toward eonsumption 
or saving depending on whether outcomes are viewed as single or sequential. Differential 
framing effects similarly occurred for sequences that offer increasing utility for gains 
(best at end of sequence) and losses (worst at beginning of sequence). The temporal order 
and coupling of payments to a mental aeeount also affected saving (Prelec & Lowenstein,
1998). Increased time and decoupling of payment and consumption minimized the pain 
o f payment.
In an effect they term the money illusion, Shafir, Diamond & Tversky (1997) 
showed people represent transactions in simple nominal terms (original dollar values) 
rather than real terms (original value plus inflation). Nominal representations of money 
cloud judgments on the value of saving as well as choices between investment options
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when inflation is factored. For example, wine connoisseurs were presented a choice of 
selling or drinking a bottle o f wine bought for $20 that is now worth $75. Only 20 percent 
evaluated the replacement cost o f drinking the wine at $75. Others considered drinking 
the wine free (30%) or a savings o f $55 (25%) (Shafir, Diamond & Tversky, 1997).
While an economic motivation explanation was offered for this example by Mackenzie 
(1997), it was readily apparent that people represented replacement costs differently. In 
another example of cognitive representation effects. Thaler and Bentarzi (2001) 
illustrated that selections among retirement plans rely on a \!n heuristic. When offered n 
funds to choose from, employees diversified contributions evenly across the choices. 
Choice bracketing has been shown to affect decisions, and Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
showed a preference to combine losses with a larger gain. The body o f research has 
provided practical guidance for increasing saving. For example, 401k plans preeommit by 
a simple rule a sequence of contributions offering long-term gain decoupled from the 
payment (i.e., a pre-paid nest egg to enjoy in retirement). This plan is considered a good 
deal by experts, requires minimal effort, rewards saving (tax incentives or employer 
matching) and was generally treated as future income off limits to current spending 
(Thaler, 1994).
Reference points and loss aversion have also been a particular focus for 
applications o f prospect theory in financial decision making (Camerer, 2000; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 2000). Prospect theory stated that the carriers of value were not absolute 
states of wealth but changes in wealth evaluated from a reference point (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). For example, Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1990) have illustrated that 
loss aversion and framing from the status quo can result in an anomaly termed the
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endowment effect. A person who bought a bottle o f wine for $10 that is now worth $200 
will neither sell the bottle for $200 nor will they replace the bottle if  it breaks for $100.
Building from such economic anomalies, a recent model has incorporated 
reference points and loss aversion with saving (Bovraian, Minehart & Rabin, 1999). 
Extending the economic insights of Duesenberry (1949), Bowman, Minehart and Rabin 
(1999) recognized that past spending helps set reference levels for current spending. 
Previous spending provides a reference point and subsequent changes to this level of 
spending were influenced by loss aversion. Under conditions o f future income 
uncertainty, people given bad news about the future demonstrated risk seeking over the 
perceived loss (resisted lowering spending). Behavioral evidence also indicated people 
given good news about the future became risk averse (resisted raising spending). Because 
losses loom larger than gains, the resistance to lower spending with bad news was greater 
than the resistance to raise spending with good news across economic data from five 
countries. These results were contrary to rational economic theory, but correspond well 
with loss aversion (Bowman, Minehart & Rabin, 1999).
Wells (2001) presented another saving model partially derived from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Integrating economic (life-cycle: Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954) and psychological theories (theory of planned behavior: Ajzen, 1985; 
mental aceounting: Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), Wells (2001) created a saving measurement 
instrument and analyzed with a LISREL structural equation model. The results indicated 
two significant mental accounting dimensions (having a current situation / short-term 
focus and making decisions with unexpected windfalls or large sums) mediated saving 
intentions (Wells, 2001).
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As noted earlier, most studies of mental accounting phenomena have consisted of 
empirical experiments, small sample demonstrations or large sample studies that test 
economic theory and offered an alternative mental aeeounting explanation (Thaler, 1999). 
A smaller number of studies have tested for mental accounting and taken a more 
descriptive, psychologieal approach using larger, nationwide data sets. A recent study hy 
Chaulk, Johnson and Bulcroft (2003) used the 1998 SCF of 4,309 households to predict 
the effect of family stage (marriage and children) upon individuals’ propensity to take 
financial risks following prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The authors 
theorized that occupying a particular family stage influenced the framing of risk options 
affecting investment selections among low risk savings accounts to higher risk stocks. 
The findings indicated households with children generally demonstrated a lower 
tolerance for risk (Chaulk, Johnson & Bulcroft, 2003).
In sum, there has been strong evidence for aggregate life-cyele alloeation patterns 
between groups. Saving corresponded predietably with the hump shaped age-eamings 
profile. However, even among wealthy households, who had the highest rate o f saving, 
these relationships were not absolute. For example in KennickelFs (1995) analysis, 
participants with net worth below $10,000 reported spending more than income (18.6%), 
the same as income (41.2%) or less than income (40.2%). These same categories were 
also represented in households with net worth in excess of $1,000,000 spending more 
than income (12.2%), the same as income (4.0%) or less than income (83.8%). While it 
was readily apparent the wealthy save more, it was also apparent that variance remains 
within both groups. Some low-income households managed to save and some wealthy 
households overspent. Similar within-group variation was found in age groups, cohorts
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and even among those matched by age, wealth and career (e.g., Stanley & Danko’s, 1996 
example o f Dr. North and Dr. South). Attanasio (1994) has succinctly stated the problem, 
“While the characterization of saving levels ... can be translated directly into significant 
information about aggregate saving, the microeconomic behavior underlying these 
aggregates deserves to be analyzed further.... Individual saving rates are very noisy 
almost by construction” (p. 111).
Mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) described a psychological process for within-group, micro-level variation in 
saving. Prospect theory illustrated a psychophysics o f chance and choice derived from a 
relative reference point. Mental aeeounting proposed a cognitive ledger for wealth with 
different propensities to consume depending on account. Mental accounting explanations 
of saving also conformed to the concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982). Intense 
cognitive effort was necessary to consciously track and derive maxima for uncertain 
factors such as interest rates and future earnings to a permanent income basis. To bridge 
the demands of an uncertain environment and costs to obtain information, people should 
prefer satisficing (a level of aspiration that provides satisfaction) to maximization. 
Economic anomalies and personal accounts of saving decisions (e.g., Kennickell, Starr- 
McCluer & Sunden, 1996) also indicated that people did not experience saving decisions 
as rationally solving an intertemporal optimization problem.
The descriptive aeeount of saving decisions diverged from the normative model 
by embedding psychological factors within a micro-level process (Bell, D. Raiffa, H. & 
Thaler, 1980; Tversky, A., 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). People’s reference points 
were partially determined by the objective status quo (e.g., demographics such as age and
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income), but reference points also incorporated expectations, beliefs, the nonlinear 
decision weights (risk seeking/aversion at ends o f probability distribution) and social 
context (Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
In conclusion, this section has presented a parallel in the decision-making and 
saving literatures. Theories of decision making and saving have transformed over time to 
incorporate more subjective terms. Mathematical models of these behaviors have grown 
in complexity to better capture unexplained heterogeneous individual variation. As 
models of saving behavior became more relative, psychology became more relevant. 
Separating Who Saves From Who Does Not
While the literature on decision-making and saving has incorporated 
psychological factors, most applied saving research generally divides people into saving 
groups along demographics or life-cycle hypothesis concepts. These divisions have 
assumed saving occurs relative to the age / income profile or life cycle position. For 
example, the Department o f Labor’s 2002 National Summit on Retirement Savings 
created four age-based saving groups: Millenial Generation (<20), Generation X (20- 
30+), Baby Boom (40-50+) and the Silent Generation (60-70) (Department o f Labor, 
2002). Other studies on American saving have focused upon a particular age (AARP,
1999) or a particular income/wealth group (Stanley & Danko, 1996; Wolff, 2000). 
Campbell and Mankiw (1991) divided populations in the United States and other 
countries into savers who are forward looking and smooth consumption according to the 
life-cycle hypothesis and spenders who spend all current income up to their liquidity 
constraint. In another study, Weil (1991) proposed that the population consists of non­
savers, forward-looking savers and non-forward looking savers who are wealthy.
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International saving classifications have similarly used life-cycle demographics 
and concepts of wealth, income and precautionary buffer stock. Babeau (1981) divided 
the French population into people who only needed storage of money, people who 
wanted storage of money and to maintain a buffer for emergencies, people with many 
needs that saved as a precautionary measure for the future, and wealthy people who are 
well informed and maintained many types of investments. Burbridge and Robb (1985) 
studied elderly savers in Canada and created two groups: blue-collar savers who 
conformed to life-cycle hypothesis and white-collar savers who did not. Lindqvist (1981) 
used a hierarchy o f saving motives to divide Swedes into four groups. The groups were: 
cash managers who had a high need for liquidity, buffer and security savers who prepared 
for unknown future needs, goal savers who saved to acquire things they cannot afford in 
one period and wealth managers who sought to increase wealth through investments 
rather than postponing consumption. In another study on Swedes, Wahlund and 
Gunnarsson (1996) used people’s debt-to-asset ratio (DTA) to create groups. Six groups 
were created: residual savers who preferred liquid savings and to carry debt (DTA=1.0), 
contractual savers who had high debt and save by paying it off (DTA=4.2), security 
savers who invested heavily in retirement financial instruments (DTA=1.3), risk hedgers 
who put wealth in more risky investments (DTA=0.52), prudent investors who put wealth 
in less risky investments (DTA=0.28), divergent strategists who diversified wealth in 
complex portfolios (DTA=0.50) (Wahlund & Gunnarsson, 1996).
In sum, selecting variables to divide savers from non-savers requires 
understanding current models of decision making and saving. The variables that influence 
saving and how they interact are most clearly specified in the notation of mathematical
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economic and psychological saving models. To date, demographic variables have 
provided a quick and objective way to classify a population into saving groups. Saving 
has been mostly predieted, studied and reported through demographie eategories (age, 
income, family size, etc.). Also, not surprisingly, because studies on saving until recently 
were eonducted only by economists, the terms used to ereate saving groups were 
predominantly extrapolated from life-cycle coneepts (wealth, precautionary buffer stocks, 
smoothing consumption, forward time-discounting, etc.). Although macroeconomic 
studies have validated aggregate life cycle saving trends (Modigliani, 1985), life cycle 
models have not consistently described micro-level household savings (Browning & 
Lusardi, 1996; Thaler, 1994) nor predieted whether an individual will save above or 
below their means:
Macroeconomie predictions have often failed during the last decades.... Some 
economists suggest that deseriptions and explanations at less aggregated levels 
are neeessary for arriving at better explanations and predictions. There is then a 
quest for something like the market segment concept (Wameryd, 1999 p36) 
Mental aceounting studies primarily occur in small group experiments or demonstrations. 
Mental accounting has also been used to provide an alternative explanation to the life­
cycle hypothesis in large samples (e.g., Bernheim, Skinner & Weinberg, 2001) and to 
provide models for consumer saving (e.g., Bowman, Minehart & Rabin, 1999; Wells, 
2001). However, nationwide studies that separate savers and non-savers by mental 
accounting have not been conducted on a scale similar to economics. If saving variation, 
is related to mental accounting psychology then saving classifieations must include 
variables beyond demographics.
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Research Question
The fundamental question of this research was what characteristics can be used to 
separate savers from non-savers beyond demographic variables? As described earlier, 
models of decision making and saving have shifted from objective, demographic 
variables toward subjective, psychologieal variables. Saving models now cite a larger 
number and variety of individual difference variables. In economics, subjective 
perceptions o f risk, interest rates, discount factors, consumption shocks and changes in 
demographics were incorporated (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). Life cycle models 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) proposed a rational process that pooled income, assets 
and future income and optimized spending across one’s lifespan to a permanent income 
level (Friedman, 1957). In psychology, mental accounts, heuristics, reference points and 
perceptions o f gain and loss were incorporated (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). The behavioral 
life cycle (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) saving model based upon prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) suggested saving occurs through short-term, mental-accounting 
heuristics that separated income, assets and future income and provided spending self- 
control.
Yet, despite the increased reliance upon psychological variables in saving models, 
these factors have not been used to describe saving in the population. Groups have not 
been formed or reported according to risk perceptions or discount factors. Current studies 
and reports of saving have relied upon demographics like age and income or generational 
stereotypes (baby boomers, generation X, millenials, etc.) to broadly characterize groups. 
As seen in Table I, the economic and psychological theories suggested very different 
characteristics to identify and separate savers from non-savers in a population. While life
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Table 1
Life cycle and Mental Accounting Profiles o f  When and How Saving Occurs
Characteristic Life cycle Mental Accounting
Use of debt Maximize to smooth spending Minimize; debt aversion
Externally limited by market Internally limited by person
Income Income > permanent ineome Any income
Age Middle age Any age
Cognitive process Rationally set spending level Heuristics control spending
View of assets Pool assets Separate assets
Time horizon Long-term, lifetime Short-term, current situation
Influenced by Bequest, Precautionary motives Current situation, heuristics
Consumption shocks/catastrophe Asset labels, experiences
Saving varies by Differing demographics Differing self-control
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cycle economic factors have been used, mental accounting psychology factors have not 
been used.
Two studies were conducted to determine what additional psychological factors 
could be used to identify successful saving. The first was qualitative and designed to 
elicit first-hand, detailed rationales for saving. The second was a quantitative secondary 
analysis of the 2001 Survey o f Consumer Finances designed to analyze how well 
psychological variables separated low versus high saving groups.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY I
To better understand what separated savers from non-savers, it was necessary to 
first explore the interplay o f life cycle demographics and mental-accounting psychology 
at a personal level. There has been remarkably little qualitative research on individuals’ 
saving experiences and thought processes (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, Sunden, 1996; 
Warneryd, 1999). Most saving studies have also examined raw saving levels (net worth, 
assets or wealth) in a sample (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). Raw savings, however, do not 
necessarily indicate how proficient a person was at accumulating wealth for their age and 
income. To determine who was successful at saving, wealth needed to be scaled for age, 
income and inheritance. The present study addressed these concerns and explored three 
questions to lay groundwork for what variables to use in identifying and separating 
people who save from people who do not in Study 2.
First, to what extent did self-depictions of saving differ among households whose 
savings are above and below what would be expected for their age and income? Stanley 
and Danko (1996) set a benchmark to scale wealth as age multiplied by income less 
inheritance divided by 10. A shorthand way to calculate this was age divided by ten times 
income less inheritance. At age 20, a person should have a net worth two times their 
income, at 30 three times, at 40 four times and so forth. When this number was compared 
to a household’s net worth, a family could be categorized as high or low saving. For 
example, a 50 year-old earning 50,000 with a net worth in excess of 250,000 would be
37
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high saving and less than 250,000 would be low saving. Would people whose savings 
were high or low versus expectation give different accounts of saving?
Second, were there common themes across demographics (age, income, etc.) and 
saving level (high/low) in how people described their savings process? Self-depictions of 
saving as pooling assets and rationally setting a permanent or long-term spending level 
would support the life cycle or permanent income hypothesis (Modigliani & Brumberg, 
1954; Friedman, 1957). Self-depictions of saving using heuristics to separate assets and 
provide short-term, spending control would support mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 
1988). What factors specified in the saving theories influenced all groups?
Third, to what extent did people across demographics and saving levels report 
influences outside the life cycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and mental accounting 
models of saving (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988)? In particular, would people cite emotion, 
personality or motivation as key reasons for saving? Was there an ethical or moral 
rationale for saving? Were social influences such as peers, upbringing, and experiencing 
or witnessing a financial catastrophe influential? What factors not specified in the saving 
theories influenced all groups?
Method
Participants. This study included 24 heads of households who were actively 
saving or inclined to save. Fourteen participants were men and 10 were women. Ages 
ranged from 23 to 77 (M = 41.9, SD = 14.1). The sample contained 23 White and 1 Black 
respondents. Most of the participants were married (18). The rest o f the sample was either 
never married (5), or widowed (1). Fifteen had one or more children. The participants
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were primarily college educated (21). Detailed demographic information about each 
participant is displayed in Table 2.
Sample Selection. A convenience sample was obtained by referral or acquaintance 
with the researcher. The sample was selected to contain a variety o f ages and a mixture 
o f males and females. Using Stanley and Danko’s (1996) scale for wealth as a guide, the 
sample was also selected according to whether the net worth as estimated by the 
researcher was greater or less than would be expected for their age and income. Twelve 
people whose estimated net worth was above expectation (high saving) and 12 people 
whose estimated net worth was below expectation (low saving) received a telephone 
solicitation to participate. Everyone who was solicited volunteered.
Materials. Five closed-ended questions and response choices from Section J of 
the Survey of Consumer Finances were used to examine participants’ saving habits, 
previous year’s spending, the length of time people plan for financially (time horizon), 
the amount o f risk people were willing to undertake with investments (risk tolerance), 
and perceived financial luck. Next, three fill-in demographic questions (age, occupation, 
sex) added by the researcher were included. Distributed through the rest o f the interview 
were five researcher questions regarding personal saving rationales; how saving was 
defined, moral reasons for saving, why others save or not, and saving strategies. To 
further probe saving rationales, the interview also included focus group questions from 
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1996) regarding saving reasons, what was saved 
for, perceived future obligations, planning for saving and sources o f information used for 
saving/investment decisions. Finally, three follow-up probes to the question “What do 
you think of when I say saving” asked participants whether they felt saving is primarily
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Table 2
Study I: Demographic Profiles o f  Interview Participants
Case Age Sex Married Kids Group® Education Occupation
1 36 M Married 0 High College Financial advisor
2 56 M Married 1 High College Retired teacher
3 59 M Married 2 High Some College Business owner
4 33 F Married 0 High College Sales manager
5 62 M Married 1 High College Retired engineer
6 77 M Widowed 1 High College Business owner
7 34 M Single 0 Low College College professor
8 35 F Single 0 Low College Marketing assistant
9 31 F Married 1 Low College Financial advisor
10 32 M Single 0 Low College Biomedical engineer
11 33 M Married 0 Low College Software developer
12 53 M Married 3 Low College Financial manager
13 47 F Married 1 Low College Entrepreneur
14 39 F Married 1 High College Marketing director
15 57 M Married 3 High College Retired dentist
16 54 F Married 0 High College Secretary
17 26 F Single 0 Low College Web designer
18 33 M Married 2 High College Business owner
19 56 M Married 2 High High School Retired entrepreneur
20 36 M Married 3 High College Business owner
21 33 F Married 2 Low College Homemaker
22 23 M Single 0 Low College Envir. engineer
23 29 F Married 1 Low Some College Quality manager
24 30 F Married 1 High College Homemaker/student
High = savings > age/income expectation, Low = savings < age/income expectation
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internal/external, stable/unstable and controllable/uncontrollable for an individual. These 
dimensions correspond to two kinds of attributions; a person attribution for behavior 
caused by consistent, internal traits and a situation attribution for behavior caused by 
temporal, external factors (Trope, 1986). The categorizations essentially asked 
respondents whether they felt others’ saving was due to a trait or a state. The topic and 
source of each interview question is displayed in Table 3.
The conversation was recorded using Digital Loggers, Inc. Personal Logger V- 
1.5.64/05/13/03 software and an RJ-11 “Y” connector for telephone handsets. The sound 
level indicator on the Personal Logger interface was monitored to ensure voice capture 
during the interview. The Personal Logger creates a digital audio file that was given a 
case number and stored for transcription. Each interview was replayed and typed from the 
audio file using Microsoft Windows Media Player vS.O. The interview text was numbered 
sequentially at each conversation transition to allow for easy reference to sections o f the 
interview. The original digital files were then written to a compact disc for permanent 
storage.
Procedure. An informed consent form (Appendix A) and a personal interview 
question sheet (Appendix B) were sent to each participant. The structured personal 
interview was delivered by telephone. Each interviewee was solicited by telephone to 
participate using the first 5 sentences of the description on the informed consent form 
(Appendix A). If the participant agreed, a consent form and question sheet was sent.
Upon return o f a signed informed consent form, a date and time for the telephone 
interview was arranged.
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Table 3
Study 1: Sources fo r  Interview Questions
Question Topic Source
1 Saving habits Survey of Consumer Finances Q741
2 Last year’s spending Survey of Consumer Finances Q743
3 Planning horizon Survey of Consumer Finances Q739
4 Risk tolerance Survey of Consumer Finances Q740




9 Saving definition Researcher
10 Reasons for saving Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
11 Moral / ethical reasons Researcher
12 Why people save or not Researcher
13 What was saved for Kermickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
14 Future expenses Survey o f Consumer Finances Q735
15 Plan for savings Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
16 Saving strategies Researcher
17 Personal saving influences Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
18 Risk and saving Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
19 Changes to saving approach Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
20 Events that influence saving Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
21 Saving information sources Kennickell, Starr-McClure & Sunden (1996)
22 Conclusion Researcher
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The interview itself consisted of a brief overview of the project, reiterating the 
consent form’s introduction. When the participant was ready, the researcher signaled that 
recording was about to begin and also reminded the interviewee not to self-identify 
during the recording. This was followed by questions read from the question sheet in 
order with limited, unscripted probing. Interview times ranged from 15 minutes to 46 
minutes lasting 24 minutes on average (M = 24.5, SD = 8.8). In return, participants were 
given a comparison of their saving attitudes versus the average responses o f Americans to 
five matched items on the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. Participants were treated 
in accord with the University of New Hampshire’s and American Psychological 
Association’s guidelines for research with human subjects.
Coding Procedure. The interview questions were coded thematically following 
Richie and Spencer’s (1994) qualitative data process knovm as framework analysis (see 
also Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000). Framework analysis consists o f five distinct steps: 
familiarization, identify a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping / 
interpretation. Familiarization consists of personally transcribing and reading the 
interviews. Second, a thematic Ifamework is identified that can contain both a priori and 
emergent themes. Third, indexing is applying the framework to the data with codes. 
Fourth, charting is using the framework headings to tally data by theme and by case. 
Finally, mapping and interpretation is examining the chart for patterns, associations and 
concepts. The data codes were then entered from the printed interview sheets into SPSS 
v l 1.5 for frequency analysis. To check the validity o f the codes, another survey 
researcher independently recoded the 24 interview transcripts, and the interrater 
reliability was good (r = .93).
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Results
Twenty-four qualitative interviews were conducted to explore three questions:
1) Do self-depictions o f saving differ between households who save more 
versus less than expected for their age and income? [group differences]
2) Do people across groups describe their saving process as long-term and 
rational or short-term and heuristic? [saving process description]
3) Is saving influenced by factors not explicit in either life cycle or mental 
accounting theories? [additional saving factors]
Group differences in saving.
Many previous studies have explained American saving by demographic 
characteristics such as age, race, education and income (e.g., Kermickell, 2001; 
Department of Labor, 2002). An analysis has not been done to investigate the effect of 
what people actually save on a benchmark scaled to age multiplied by income less 
inheritance divided by 10 (Stanley & Danko, 1996). As mentioned in the procedure, two 
groups of 12 were formed for comparison based upon an estimate of whether the 
household’s net worth was greater than this benchmark (high saving) or less than this 
benchmark (low saving). Despite considerable similarities, subtle differences between the 
high and low saving groups were observed in the qualitative interviews.
A one-way ANOVA of group (high vs. low saving) was conducted to test for a 
difference in age. The high saving group (M = 49.5, SD  =14.8) was significantly older (F 
(1, 23) = 9.56,p  = .005) than the low saving group (M = 34.3, SD  =8.3). The high saving 
group also tended to have a larger number of children (M  = 1.4, SD  = 1.0) versus the low 
saving group (M = 0.7, SD  = 1.0) but this difference was not significant. While both
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groups were similarly educated, the high saving group was almost exclusively married 
(11) versus the low saving group (7). Frequencies for age, marital status, education and 
children are displayed in Table 4.
Table 5 displays frequencies for saving habits, spending, time horizon and risk 
tolerance. A two (high vs. low saving) by three (next few years, next 5-10 years, longer 
than 10 years) Pearson chi-square test was performed on planning time horizons by 
saving groups saving habits (put money aside regularly, save one income/spend other, no 
plan). The distribution o f planning time horizons for below and high saving groups was 
not significantly different (x^ (2) = 0.157,/? = .925). Most participants reported having a 
time horizon for planning savings and investments of more than 10 years (17) followed 
by the next few years (5). A similar Pearson chi-square test was performed on saving 
habits (put aside money regularly, save one income/spend other, no regular plan) versus 
saving group (high vs. low saving). The high and low saving groups were nearly identical 
in reported saving habits and plaiming time horizons. For both groups, the predominant 
saving habit was to save regularly by putting aside money each month (20) followed by 
no plan/save leftover (3) and this difference was not significant (x (1) = 3.733,/? = .292).
One-way ANOVAs of group (high vs. low saving) were also performed on saving 
habits and acceptable risk levels. While everyone in the high saving group reported 
spending less than income in the previous year (12), versus the low saving group (9), this 
difference was not significant (F ( l ,  23) 3.13,/? = .082). The groups also did not 
significantly differ in preference for risk (F (1, 23) 3.67,/? = .069).
The high and low saving groups reported relatively similar reasons for saving and 
these differed slightly depending upon the time period: past saving, current saving and
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Table 4
Study 1: Participant Age, Marital Status, Education and Children Frequencies
Question
Frequencies 






>35 11 5 6 8 3
35-44 4 2 2 2 2
45-54 3 1 2 2 1
55-64 5 5 - - 5
65-74 - - - - -
<=75 1 1 - - 1
Marital Status
Married 18 10 8 7 11
Separated - - - - -
Divorced - - - - -
Widow 1 1 - - 1
Not married 5 3 2 5 -
Education
No high school diploma - - - - -
High school diploma 1 1 - - 1
Some college 2 1 1 1 1
College degree 21 12 9 11 10
Children
0 9 5 4 7 2
1 8 3 5 3 5
2 4 3 1 1 3
3 or more 3 3 - 1 2
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Table 5
Study 1: Saving Habits, Spending, Time Horizon and Risk Tolerance Frequencies
Question
Frequencies of 
All Male Female Low High 
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12) (n=12)
Saving habits
Don’t save, spend>income - - - - -
Don’t save, spend=income - - - - -
No plan, save leftover 3 1 2 2 1
Save 1 income, spend other - - - - -
Save other income 1 - 1 1 -
Save regularly, put aside 20 13 7 9 11
Last year’s spending
Spending > income 2 1 1 2 -
Spending = income 1 - 1 1 -
Spending < income 21 13 8 9 12
Planning time horizon
Next year - - - - -
Next few years 5 4 1 3 2
Next 5-10 years 2 1 1 1 1
Longer than 10 years 17 9 8 8 9
Risk willing to take
Substantial 1 1 - 1 -
Above average 6 4 2 4 2
Average 15 8 7 7 8
No financial risk 2 1 1 - 2
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future saving. As seen by the frequencies for past saving and saving planning in Table 6, 
both the high and low saving groups’ past saving was directed at buying similar things 
for themselves: house (15), ear (11), vacation (6), other purchases (6), contractual debts 
(5), wedding (3). Those in the high saving group also tended to report deliberately 
planning their savings (9) more frequently versus low saving (4). The low saving group 
was more likely to say they decided as things came up (5) or both (3). A 2 (high saving, 
low saving) x 3 (plan, no plan, both), Pearson ehi-square test was performed; however, 
and this difference was not significant (x^ (1) = 4.79,/> = .091).
Frequencies for current saving reasons in Table 7 indicated that both groups again 
cited the same reasons in the same order: emergencies / security / unexpected needs (17), 
retirement / old age (10), “for the children / family; help kids” (7) and buy durable goods 
/ things when wanted or needed (4). The frequencies of future saving obligations 
illustrated in Table 8 also indicated that the groups perceived the same top three future 
financial obligations: children’s education (11), retirement (11) and home repairs / 
improvements (6). Future saving items reported tended to be for family and retirement 
self-sufficiency. However, the high saving group differed slightly by including in the 
scope of future financial obligations health care for spouse / self / others (4) and a 
personal business (4). Overall, the high and low saving groups were fairly similar in their 
assessments of past, current and future saving. Past saving was directed at buying things 
and displayed what Browning and Lusardi (1996) term a down payment motive. Current 
saving was largely precautionary. Future saving was directed toward life cycle expenses. 
One difference between the groups was evident in the frequencies for financial luck. On 
a five point rating scale for perceived luck in financial affairs, a one-way ANOVA
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Table 6
Study 1: Past Saving and Saving Planning Frequencies
Question
Frequencies 





What have you saved for in past (multiple response)
Children’s education 6 5 1 2 4
Own/spouse’s education 2 1 1 1 1
For children/help kids 1 1 1 2 -
Wedding/other ceremony 2 - 2 1 1
To have kids/family 2 1 1 1 1
Buy own house 15 9 6 6 9
Buy second house 1 1 - 1 -
Buy car/boat/vehicle 11 7 4 5 6
Home improvement/repair 2 1 1 1 1
Travel, take vacations 6 2 4 2 4
Other purchases 6 3 3 3 3
Charitable/religious gifts 1 1 - - 1
To enjoy life 1 1 - - 1
Buy/invest in own business 4 4 - - 4
Retirement/old age 6 2 4 3 3
Emergencies/unexpected 1 - 1 1 -
Investments 4 3 1 2 2
Commitments, debt, taxes 5 5 - 2 3
Advance living standard 1 1 - 1 -
Living expenses/bills 1 1 - - 1
Deliberately plan savings
Deliberately plan 13 11 2 4 9
Decide as things come up 6 2 4 5 1
Both 5 1 4 3 2
49
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Table 7
Study 1: Reasons fo r  Saving Frequencies
Frequencies of
Question All Male Female Low High
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12) (n=12)
Children's education 1 2 1 1
Own/ spouse's education - - - - -
For children/family; help kids 7 3 4 5 2
Buying own house - - - - -
Buy a car, boat or vehicle - - - - -
Home improvements/repairs - - - - -
To travel; take vacations 1 - 1 - 1
Buy goods; other purchase 4 3 1 2 2
Charitable/religious gift 1 1 - - 1
To enjoy life 2 1 1 2 -
Investing in own business - - - - -
Retirement/old age 10 6 4 4 6
In case of unemployment 1 - 1 1 -
In case o f illness 1 1 - 1 -
Emergencies; security 17 10 7 8 9
Investments 1 1 - - 1
Commitments -  repay debt - - - - -
Advance standard of living 3 3 - 1 2
Ordinary expenses/bills 1 1 - 1 -
For the future 1 1 - 1 -
Wise/prudent thing to do - - - - -
Liquidity; to have cash - - - - -
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Table 8
Study 1: Financial Luck and Perceived Future Obligation Frequencies
Question
Frequencies 





Luck in financial affairs 
Agree Strongly 8 5 3 2 6
Agree Somewhat 10 6 4 5 5
Neither Agree/Disagree 4 3 1 3 1
Disagree Somewhat 1 - 1 1 -
Disagree Strongly 1 - 1 1 -
Future obligations saving for (multiple response) 
Children's education 11 5 6 6 5
Own education; spouse 2 1 1 2 -
Health care self/spouse 3 1 2 - 3
Health care others 1 - 1 - 1
Support self/retirement 11 5 6 6 5
Support child 5 4 1 2 3
Support parents 1 1 - 1 -
Support others 1 - 1 - 1
Buy home 3 1 2 3 -
Buy car/durable goods 2 - 2 1 1
Home repair/improve 6 4 2 3 3
Weddings, vacations, etc. 1 1 - 1 -
Business; start/expand 3 3 - - 4
Investment 3 3 - 1 2
Bills/living expenses 4 2 2 2 2
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showed the high and low saving groups were significantly different (-F(l, 23) 5.57, p  = 
.028). The high saving group rated their financial luck higher than the below average 
group.
Table 9 illustrated frequencies for saving information sources. The information 
sources used by each group to make saving and investment decisions were similar with a 
few exceptions. The younger, low saving group was more likely to report using the 
Internet (3) and material from work or work contacts (5). The high saving group 
preferred personal research (10) and reading (5). Surprisingly, both groups reported a 
similar reliance upon friends / relatives and professionals (lawyers, accountants, brokers, 
financial planners).
Table 10 illustrated frequencies for the definition of saving, categorization of 
saving versus investing and saving attributions. When asked whether saving and 
investing were different, there was a clear difference between the high and low saving 
groups. A 2 (investing/saving same, investing/saving different) x 2 (high/low saving), 
Pearson chi-square test was performed. The high saving group was significantly more 
likely to equate saving and investing than the low saving group (x^ (1) = 5.042,/? = .025). 
For example, one high saving respondent replied, “I would say saving is a type of 
investing -  or investing is a type of saving” (respondent 24, female, high saving). Both 
the high and low saving groups also defined saving primarily as an action: putting money 
aside / away, not spending, or allocating resources. The attributional patterns of high and 
low saving groups were almost identical and showed a preference for internal, stable and 
controllable attributions across groups.
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Table 9
Study 1: Saving and Investment Information Source Frequencies
_____________Frequencies of
Question All Male Female Low High
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12) (n=12)
Information sources used (multiple response)
Call around 1 1 - 1 -
Magazines/newspapers 8 5 3 3 5
TV/radio 2 1 1 - 2
Online/Internet 3 2 1 3 -
Friend/relative 10 5 5 5 5
Lawyer 1 1 - - 1
Accountant 4 2 2 1 3
Banker - - - - -
Broker 7 3 4 4 3
Financial planner 4 1 3 2 2
Self/personal research 13 8 5 3 10
Material from work/eontacts 5 3 2 5 -
Investment seminars 1 1 - - 1
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Table 10
Study 1: Saving Definition, Saving vs. Investing, Saving Attribution Frequencies
Question
Frequencies of




Saving definition (multiple response)
Put money aside/away 12 6 6 6 6
Not spending/conserving 5 4 1 3 2
Plan/allocate resources 2 2 - 1 1
Bank/money/retirement 7 3 4 3 4
Security, unforeseen event 2 - 2 1 1
Saving same as investing
No 17 10 7 11 6
Yes 7 4 3 1 6
Saving internal/external
Internal 16 12 4 9 7
External 2 - 2 1 1
Both 6 2 4 2 4
Saving stable/unstable
Stable 16 9 7 8 8
Unstable 6 4 2 3 3
Both 2 1 1 1 1
Saving controllable/not
Controllable 19 12 7 9 10
Uncontrollable 1 - 1 - 1
Both 4 2 2 3 1
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In Table 11, response frequencies are displayed for a perceiving a moral 
obligation to save and the reasons given for why other people save or do not. The high 
and low saving groups uniformly cited a moral obligation to save and used similar 
categories to describe this obligation. The only descriptive difference in response 
frequencies was that the high saving group was slightly more likely to mention duty as 
family provider. When asked why others saved or not, both groups again gave similar 
answers. A notable difference was that the high saving group cited having a high income 
as a reason for others’ saving (3) while the low saving group cited desire / priority / 
mindset (6), self-control / delaying gratification (4) and long time horizons (7).
Both the high and low saving groups consistently reported using mental 
accounting heuristics as seen in the frequencies for different saving strategies in Table 12. 
The low saving group was more inclined to cite the need for spending discipline (9) and 
used heuristics to make money inaccessible (5) like 401k tax shelters (5) and automatic 
payroll deduction (5). The high and low saving groups were also very similar in 
experiences that were cited as influential and in risk perceptions as seen by response 
frequencies in Table 13. Some notable exceptions were that only high saving group 
mentioned working / saving early in life (5) and a religious influence (3). Further, the 
groups were evenly matched in their assessment of risk’s influence on their savings 
approaches. Both high and low saving groups cited that current age, comfort level and 
having a strategy/plan affects their assessment of risk.
Finally, frequencies displayed in Table 14 illustrated high and low saving groups 
reported similar changes in their saving approaches over time. While four members o f the 
high saving group and one in the low saving group reported their saving approach had not
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Table 11
Study 1: Moral Saving Obligation and Why Others Save or Do Not Save Frequencies
Question
Frequencies of




Why feel moral obligation to save (multiple response)
Not to be dependent/burden 7 5 2 4 3
Duty as family provider 12 9 3 4 8
Religious share/steward gifts 3 - 3 2 1
Wrong to be wasteful 3 1 2 1 2
Why other people save (multiple response) 
Desire/priority/mindset 9 5 4 6 3
Can afford, high income 3 1 2 - 3
Upbringing/family 8 6 2 3 5
Self-eontrol/delay gratification 4 3 1 4 -
Security/peace of mind 3 1 2 3 -
Long time horizon 9 5 4 7 2
Peers/spouse/social influence 1 - 1 1 -
Conservative personality 4 3 1 1 2
Why others do not save (multiple response) 
No desire, not priority 2 1 1 2
Can’t afford, low income 5 1 4 4 1
Not in upbringing/family 3 2 1 1 2
Lack education/knowledge 5 3 2 4 1
No control/impulsive 8 6 2 4 4
Lack mental/planning ability 4 3 1 1 3
Short time horizon 10 4 6 7 3
Non-saver personality 2 1 1 - 2
Hardship medical/financial 4 2 2 2 2
Peers/spouse/social influence 3 2 1 1 2
Procrastinate/future better 2 2 ” 1 1
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Table 12
Study 1: Saving Strategy Frequencies
Question
Frequencies of 
All Male Female Low High 
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12) (n=12)
Strategies to put aside money (multiple response) 
Tax shelter, 401k, 403b, SEP 8 2 6 5 3
Calculate goal cost, divide up 8 6 2 4 4
Spending discipline 12 7 5 9 3
Create separate accounts 6 5 1 2 4
Make money inaccessible 6 4 2 5 1
Set goals, separate want/need 4 3 1 3 1
Adjust savings to income 3 2 1 1 2
Personal heuristic, informal 13 7 6 5 8
Budget, plan 6 3 3 3 3
Save unspent income 5 2 3 1 4
Automatically deduct from pay 8 4 4 5 3
Save windfalls, endowments 2 1 1 1 1
Minimize debt, pay in cash 3 2 1 2 1
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Table 13
Study 1: Personal Saving Influences and Influence o f  Risk Frequencies
Question
Frequencies of 
All Male Female Low 
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12)
High
(n=12)
Experiences/circumstance/personality influences on saving (multiple response)
Poverty, debt, bankruptcy 9 4 5 4 5
Upbringing, family 14 7 7 7 7
Running a business 2 1 1 1 1
Working/saving early in life 5 3 2 - 5
Conservative personality 9 5 4 4 5
Hardship medical/financial 1 1 - 1 -
Peers/spouse social influence 3 2 1 3 -
Income level 2 1 1 1 1
Marriage/kids, family transition 2 1 1 1 1
New/lost job, career transition 3 1 2 2 1
Witness others’ hardship 2 - 2 2 -
Religious influence 3 2 1 - 3
Divorce 1 1 - - 1
Attain goal/item to purchase 2 
Risk influence saving (multiple response)
1 1 2
Risk averse, low tolerance 5 3 2 2 3
Risk seeking, high tolerance 8 6 2 3 5
Seek moderate risk level 3 1 2 2 1
Lower risk by strategy/plan 10 4 6 6 4
Current age affects risk 13 10 3 5 8
Comfort level affects risk 9 5 4 5 4
Wealth level affects risk 1 1 - 1 -
Family affects risk 3 1 2 1 2
Adjust risk to situation 8 5 3 3 5
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Table 14
Study 1: Changes in Saving Approach Frequencies
Frequencies of
Question All Male Female Low High
(n=24) (n=14) (n=10) (n=12) (n=12)
Did saving approach change
Changed 19 10 9 11 8
Has not changed 5 4 1 1 4
How saving approach changed (multiple response) 
Less risk, more conservative 8 6 2 2 6
More risk, more aggressive 1 1 - - 1
Save more 8 2 6 8 -
Save less 1 1 - 1 -
Alter spending habits 4 3 1 1 3
Save for different things 1 - 1 1 -
Alter saving habits 1 - 1 - 1
Events that changed approach (multiple response) 
Running a business 2 2 2
Education/courses/advisement 8 7 1 3 5
Hardship mcdical/financial 5 3 2 2 3
Peers/spouse social influence 3 3 - 1 2
Income level 8 4 4 5 3
Marriage/kids, family transition 9 3 6 4 5
New/lost job, career transition 4 2 2 4 -
Home owner, debt transition 6 2 4 4 2
Endowment, asset transition 3 3 - 1 2
Witness others hardship 3 - 3 1 2
Religious influence 1 - 1 1 -
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changed, the vast majority in both groups indicated their saving approach had changed. 
The most noteworthy change cited by the high saving group was taking less risk and 
being more conservative (6). For the low saving group, a ehange to save more (8) was the 
most frequent response. The events that were cited by both groups as causing a change in 
their saving approach were generally the same. Two exceptions were that the high saving 
group alone cited running a business as influential (2) and the low saving group alone 
cited an employment transition as influential (4).
In addition to the high and low saving comparisons, group saving differences 
were explored between men and women. Differences between the sexes in saving have 
received less attention from researchers (Sunden & Surette, 1999), but there were some 
interesting differences observed in these interviews. Men were more likely to say they 
deliberately planned savings (11) in eontrast to women who were more likely to decide as 
things come up (4) or both (4). A 2 (male, female) x 3 (plan, no plan, both), Pearson ehi- 
square test was performed. A significant difference was apparent in planning savings 
between men and women (x (2) = 8.26,p  = .016). Three 2 x 2  Pearson chi-square test 
were conducted on attributional preferences (internal / external; stable / unstable; and 
controllable / uncontrollable) for males and females. Only one result was significant. 
Males and females differed significantly in categorizing saving as internal/external (x^
{2) = 6 . \ l \ , p  = .046). Men tended to emphasize internal and women tended to emphasize 
external or both. In the v^ords of one male respondent:
I don’t think it’s external factors, I think it’s primarily internal. The basis for my 
reason there is that I’ve seen high-income people who don’t save or invest in very 
good assets. Then, I’ve seen people with very modest income retain a very large
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portion of their income. I think that’s purely internal, (respondent 20, male, high 
saving)
A female respondent who felt it was hoth internal and external felt differently; “I think it 
certainly depends on such things as income and unforeseen expenses” (respondent 8, 
female, low saving). Another woman who said both responded: “I think the thing, for 
me, that really has affected it was being divorced which would be more external in 
nature” (respondent 14, female, high saving).
Overall, the high and low saving groups were similar across most measures. Both 
groups tended to cite similar influences and reasons for saving. Some observed 
differences in this small sample were that the high saving group was: older, had more 
children, spent less than income, preferred less risk / more conservative, felt financially 
lucky, deliberately planned savings and personally conducted investment research. Men 
and women in the sample also differed in deliberately planning savings and using person 
attributions for others’ saving.
Saving process description.
The interviews conducted in Study 1 cited many heuristics for short-term, 
spending control supporting mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). In the first 
open-ended question, “What do you think of when I say saving?”, most participants 
associated saving with an action such as putting money away (12), controlling spending 
(5) or planning and allocating resources (2). For example, “I think o f putting money away 
outside of use for say the next six months” (respondent 4, female, high saving) or 
“Conserving” (respondent 5, male, high saving). The second most predominant type of 
association for saving was a tangible outcome (retirement) or means to saving
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(bank/money) (7); “I think it’s really retirement as far as saving goes” (respondent 7, 
male, low saving). Least associated with saving were intangible outcomes such as 
security or unforeseen events; “I think security. I think future. I think rainy days. I think 
making sure there’s something to fall back on.” (respondent 8, female, low saving).
For 17 participants, there was also a clear-cut difference between saving and 
investing. For example, “Saving could be literally sticking money under your mattress, 
but that’s not investing. Investing to me means buying something” (respondent 1, male, 
low saving). According to participants who perceived a difference, investments had 
higher returns, higher risks and longer time-horizons. In contrast, savings were described 
as low return, low risk and short-term. Savings were also described as a basis or tool for 
investments, “Savings give you the ability to invest. Investing is where you try to 
generate as much capital as possible” (respondent 3, male, high saving). The remaining 7 
participants tended to view saving and investing as interrelated, “Yes it is the same. I 
would say that investing is a subset of saving, it is a kind of saving” (respondent 9, 
female, low saving). Overall, the observed tendency among most participants was to 
separate the processes and assets associated with saving and investing into different 
categories with different characteristics.
Pervasive use of heuristics and mental accounting (Thaler, 1992) were apparent in 
responses to the question, “Can you describe any strategies to put aside money for your 
saving goals?“ Over half of participants (13) reported using a personal, informal heuristic 
and 12 also reported the need for self-control/spending discipline to save. For example,
I think the easiest way to do it is, you sit down at the begiiming of the month or 
when you get paid, and put things into separate accounts. I have a lot of bank
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accounts. One of them is for my recurring expenses... I run my own little escrow 
account. Every year in June, 1 look through all the cancelled checks and figure out 
how much I spend and how much am I putting in there, (respondent 2, male, high 
saving)
As seen in Table 12, other mental accounting heuristics were widely used. These 
included: using automatic deduction (8), tax shelters such as 401k, 403b, IRA and SEP 
(8), creating separate accounts (6), making money inaccessible (6), adjusting savings to 
current income (3) and saving windfalls (2). Heuristics were cited consistently by almost 
everyone interviewed. Mental accounting heuristics were used across participants ranging 
in age from 23 to 77. This is a stark contrast to generational or age-cohort accounts of 
saving (e.g.. Department o f Labor, 2002) which portray saving as dependent upon 
common experiences and attitudes different generations share. Both men and women 
used heuristics. While many studies have observed gender differences in saving and 
financial decision-making (e.g., Sunden & Surette, 1999), both sexes seem to share 
mental accounting. Finally, people with high and low saving used heuristics equally.
Participants voiced a central tenet of the Shefrin and Thaler’s (1988) behavioral 
life cycle hypothesis, saving requires effort and self-control strategies that decreased 
effort were more successful:
There are a couple o f no-brainer items we do automatically. We don’t even see 
the money -  it’s gone from either our bank accounts or our paycheck. We both 
max out our 40Iks at work (respondent 4, female, high saving)
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I think if you have it taken out of your bank account or paycheck automatically... 
That’s a great way to do it. ... [it takes] the inertia out of the equation. If it 
happens automatically, you have to take a pretty big step to make it stop 
(respondent 1, male, low saving)
Basically, my strategy is not to see the money.. .because making the decision to 
do it every week ... you’re less likely to do it (respondent 9, female, low saving)
You don’t see it in your paycheck at all, it’s not even considered 
(respondent 11, male, low saving)
I just try to stick [money] away in a different account. Kind of pretend it’s not 
there and don’t give myself a chance to spend it.
(respondent 22, male, low saving)
There is also deciding that certain parts of your income are not parts o f your 
income in a sense, (respondent 7, male, low saving)
It is worth noting that adopting the 401k, 403b, IRA or SEP pre-tax contribution 
maximum was a heuristic for setting contribution levels as opposed to personally 
estimating amounts to save for retirement. As Thaler (1994) observes, tax-sheltered 
annuities such as a 401k or 403b are good mental accounting heuristics: a) the money is 
perceived as off limits for spending/penalized for spending, b) saving is immediately
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rewarded, c) they are simple to use and understand, and d) it is considered a smart thing 
to do / good deal by experts. People tend to follow the path o f least cognitive effort. For 
example, Choi et al. (2001) tested the before and after levels o f saving in 401k plans at 
three companies with 80,000 employees where the 401k went from a choice to automatic 
participation by default. The findings indicated:
Automatic enrollment drastically changes 401k savings behavior. Most 
employees passively accept the automatic enrollment defaults, including the 
default savings rate and default fund. (Choi et al., 2001, p 28)
Another heuristic many participants used for establishing a saving guideline was to 
estimate the future cost o f a good and divide saving into a set of equal monthly 
installments.
If you have an annual budget for your personal needs, you have things in that 
personal budget that happen once or twice a year ... What I ’ve found to be very 
effective is circle those things in your budget like that and open a savings account 
and draw from your checking account into your savings account the sum of those 
items, (respondent 20, male, high saving)
This is noteworthy. It is an example where saving was not the unintentional by-product of 
achieving an income exceeding expenses. Saving here was intentionally under-spending 
to achieve a goal. For example, when asked what influenced her to save, one respondent 
replied:
I think goals too. When I was in school, in college, I knew you had to save and 
pay off loans and things like that. I really, really wanted to go to a school that 
cost a lot o f money! [laughs]. So I think that can be an important part of saving
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too -  if  you want something a lot (respondent 24, female, high saving)
Having near-term saving goals and self-control not to spend were prevalent in 
descriptions of saving. Frequencies reported in Table 11 indicated that the leading 
reasons cited for saving were: desire / priority / mindset (9), long-time horizon (9) and 
self-control / delay gratification (4). The leading reasons cited for not saving were short- 
time horizon (11) and a lack o f self-control/impulsivity (9). Rationally establishing a 
long-term spending level seemed to be a foreign thought process among these 
participants. For example, six participants mentioned using an annual budget to monitor 
spending. No one mentioned establishing a 5, 10 or 20-year budget with set spending 
levels or a proportional growth constant. Saving, as described in these interviews, was 
similarly not a synthesis o f assets. People did not remove asset labels and pool things 
together to set a spending limit. Saving was described analytically. People gave assets 
labels and separated them into different categories again supporting a short-term, mental- 
accounting heuristic approach.
The strategies used to put money aside were largely informal and unique to the 
individual. Only one participant (respondent 15, male, high saving) mentioned attending 
formal seminars on saving and investing. Many participants said their saving strategies 
were self-taught or garnered from observation, trial and error, and incidental learning:
You know, I might sound like I’ve got this all organized, but it’s just in my head, 
(respondent 1, male, high saving)
[saving strategies] surely did not come from a formal education for me. 
(respondent 14, female, high saving)
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I haven’t really had any training on saving, (respondent 22, male, low saving)
People did not discuss their financial future in terms of certainties nor probabilities. In 
fact, many people remarked at feeling very uninformed:
1 don’t pay enough attention to financial reports on the television or anything like 
that to affect what I am doing, (respondent 8, female, low saving)
I am not very well informed.. .Really, my lack of very good information leads me 
to believe that I need to diversify (respondent 7, male, low saving)
No one described a rational process for estimating the value of current and future assets 
to set an optimal spending level as proposed by the life cycle theory (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954).
A strong tendency among participants answering the question “how has your 
saving approach changed” was to report becoming increasingly more conservative/ 
preferring less risk (8) and saving more (8) over time. There also were changes in saving 
approaches that occurred with asset acquisition like home ownership:
.. .buying the house and having something to lose. The house gave us a sense of 
permanence which means you have to make all kinds of longer-term plans 
(respondent 9, female, low saving)
For those with assets, the preference for lower risk and loss aversion directly followed 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function. Because “losses loom larger than gains”
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279), the value function for losses is steeper than for 
gains which leads to risk aversion. As Shefrin and Thaler (1988) observe, the elderly do 
not dissave their assets to a permanent income level and are reticent to spend housing 
equity. Participants’ saving descriptions mirrored the prospect theory value function in 
many respects.
People did refer to changes brought about by their stage o f life. When asked if he 
foresaw any future financial obligations, a 77 year-old respondent replied “really at my 
age nothing major ... If I were younger, I probably wouldn’t give you the same answer” 
(respondent 6, male, high saving). Similarly, a 26 year old respondent said the way her 
saving approach had changed was that “the security means a great deal -  which I would 
never have understood or appreciated at a younger age” (respondent 17, female, low 
saving). Another respondent notes “the stages o f life you go through ... warrant changes 
in your [saving] styles. Your needs are different as you go through life” (respondent 16, 
female, high saving). However, these life cycle changes were often unanticipated and 
primarily reflected the household’s current situation. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose 
that savings depended on current income and that people do not smooth their spending 
over time. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) also portray decisions made under risk 
and uncertainty as weighing gain or loss from a reference point with a bias toward the 
status quo (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). For most participants’, the saving decision 
reference point appeared to be the current situation as opposed to a life cycle assessment 
of past, present and future. Nineteen of the twenty-four participants indicated their saving 
approach had changed over time. For example, “[our saving approach] had to be flexible 
... to accommodate whatever our incomes are at a certain time” (respondent 13, female.
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low saving) and “Fm  not sure that anything exactly influenced [my saving approach] 
other than as situations changed” (respondent 12, male, low saving). Overall, the self­
depictions of saving among these participants consistently portray the process for making 
saving decisions as relatively short-term and heuristic.
Finally, life cycle theories propose that a primary constraint on people’s 
borrowing is external (Thaler, 1992). That is to say, people will borrow until financial 
institutions refuse to lend and impose a liquidity constraint. However, a number of 
participants indicated strong debt aversion and self-imposed borrowing constraints:
I’m too cheap to pay interest on a lot of things, so I save for cars. Paying interest 
if  you don’t have to is stupid, (respondent 3, male, high saving)
.. .while I was in college I spent all the money and went into debt $ 15,000 on 
credit cards. ... I don’t know what that was all about, but fortunately ... I ended 
up being able to pay it down to zero before I got out o f college. I don’t like owing 
people money now - even if it’s a matter of someone lending me $20 .1 don’t like 
having that over my head, (respondent 20, male, high saving)
Halfway through junior year of college, I started getting into huge debt for 
school.. .Boy, that was the dumbest thing of all time. It’s taken me about 10 years 
to get rid o f i t .. .Now that I have something. I’m doing everything I can to save 
and not go back into that debt that I was in. (respondent 10, male, low saving)
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Lack of borrowing was not at the sole discretion of financial institutions. Some 
participants conveyed a strong personal experience that led to their debt aversion again 
underscoring the importance of mental accounting and psychological factors.
Additional saving factors.
The frequencies o f experiences, circumstances, personality and risk on saving are 
reported in Table 13. Many factors not traditionally associated with life cycle or mental 
accounting saving theories were cited as influential. The most notable factors were social 
experiences and ethics/morals. Two other processes that may be relevant to saving, adult 
development and attributional processes, were evident in participants’ answers, but are 
largely unaccounted for in the saving literature (Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Wameryd, 
1999).
Every participant was able to share an aspect of their circumstances, experience or 
personality that influenced their ability to save. The overwhelming majority of responses 
indicated an influential experience (17). Personality (4) and circumstances (3) were 
mentioned less often. The experiences recalled were often vivid, powerful and 
compelling. For example:
My dad had a massive heart attack back in 1946. At that time, there were no 
insurance policies for average working people and that, for all practical purposes 
bankrupt them .. .1 can still remember as a youth, although many years had gone 
by, still making payments to [hospital]. So I think that had an influence on my 
life. Always having in the back o f my mind deep down somewhat of a fear of 
poverty. I never wanted to be in that situation, (respondent 3, male, high saving)
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Growing up during the Depression you learn some pretty good lessons as far as 
savings go. (respondent 6, male, high saving)
When I had [my daughter] being on disability and going baek to work part-time 
made us really reevaluate our financial situation, (respondent 23, female, low 
saving)
Terrorism! Living in New York City! We had a safety deposit box in the World 
Trade Center! .. .There’s this whole plan in the event of a catastrophic thing. 
You’ve got to save in a different way almost. So you can get at money when 
everything else is not available in different locations ... Now we buy gold bars... 
(respondent 24, female, high saving)
I do see my parents right now and know that perhaps they did have an opportunity 
or two back 30 or 40 years ago that would make their lives a lot more comfortable 
right now. They didn’t do that and then really bad things happened .. .their 
country evaporated! [civil war forced parents to flee country for U.S.] That really 
does influence me to think how do you really make things secure long-term? 
(respondent 7, male, low saving)
Growing up in a large family on a fireman’s salary you certainly learn what you 
need and don’t need (respondent 9, female, low saving)
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The most cited experiences were upbringing (14), poverty/debt/bankruptcy (9) and 
working/saving early in life (5). A few participants noted that hardship did not have to be 
experienced personally. Participants reported significant influence from a 
financial/medical hardship that was witnessed among friends or relatives.
You know, a lot of people will live life to the hilt and forget about the future. 1 
had a friend die when he was 38 years old. He had no life insurance whatsoever 
and he had 2 kids. I think that was improper, (respondent 2, male, high saving) 
These experiences often led to a strong emotional tie to saving. For example:
My dad started a business ... and my parents pretty much took all their money 
and put it in there. When that did not work and we came back -  we didn’t have 
anything. ... It was hard. I just remember for years, and even now, just them -  
getting them baek on their feet and what they went through. ..S o l think that had a 
large impression on me. These were people who worked really, really hard, you 
know. I f  s not like they were lazy. ... 1 didn’t want to be in that situation, 
(respondent 24, female, high saving)
However, the impact of these experiences on saving was not straightforward. It might be 
tempting to say poverty, loss of employment or a health problem has a unilateral negative 
effect on saving. As seen here, some participants reported the exact opposite. A negative 
experience made them an extraordinary saver highly motivated to prevent a financial 
hardship from happening again. For example, another participant notes:
Saving is very important to us right now because we’ve burned through a lot o f it 
and we know how important it can be to have it.
(respondent 9, female, low saving)
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Similarly, one’s upbringing could model excellent saving or engrain very poor saving as
exemplified in the following excerpts:
I think my parents have been a big influence. As far as saving goes that would be 
a negative influence! My family is very impulsive and my dad always had a very 
stable and very good job ... we generally got what we wanted, (respondent 17, 
female, low saving)
“ .. .my dad was a millionaire ... he brought me into his thoughts on financial 
planning and financial management at a very young age.. .1 managed my own 
investments portfolio when I was about 10 years old.. .So I think that I learned a 
lot from him” (respondent 20, male, high saving)
There were participants who were known through their relationship with the researcher to 
have undergone very similar experiences (e.g., recent job loss). However, some people 
did not mention these experiences at all during the interview. This may be due to 
differing levels of comfort in disclosure or knowing the researcher. However, it does not 
appear that a particular experience is equally salient nor does it influence everyone’s 
saving in the same direction. Saving outcomes appear to depend strongly upon the 
individual’s response to the experience. In terms o f other saving influences, many 
participants again cited a conservative personality (9). Transitions in marriage / 
parenthood (2), employment (2) and income (2) were also influential circumstances.
Not mentioned in either the life cycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) or mental 
accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) approaches to saving, is a moral or ethical
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component to saving. Surprisingly, participants expressed a strong moral or ethical
imperative to save. Twenty out o f twenty-four said they felt a moral or ethical obligation
to save. The primary reasons cited were: duty as a family provider (12), not to be
dependent/burden on others/society (7), religious obligation to share/steward what you
have (4) and that waste/excess is wrong (3). Most striking and surprising was the moral
obligation people expressed to provide for themselves and not be dependent upon others:
I think the moral obligation to me is that you take care of yourself. You can’t 
expect people to take care of you. In other words, you save for your life, or 
retirement or whatever, and it’s so you aren’t a burden on other people whether 
through the social system or your own family, (respondent 19, male, high saving)
I feel that you should be able to cake care of yourself in a maimer that you’re not 
a burden on society or others, (respondent 4, female, high saving)
I don’t want to be dependent upon other people, (respondent 11, male, low 
saving)
.. .the last thing you want to do is run out of resources .. .1 think it would be 
horrible to ask other people to support you. (respondent 5, male, high saving)
It is worth noting that the desire to not be dependent was phrased differently than 
Keynes (1936) independence motive for saving, “the power to do things”, or life cycle 
motive to “provide for future needs”. For example, the assertion “1 don’t want to be a 
burden on society” (respondent 8, female, low saving) has a different connotation than 
“earned income for me vv^ ill end presumably, so I’ll need money to do things” (respondent 
1, male, low saving). Independence conjures positive images of self-reliance, power to 
choose and capability. Achieving independence is an esteemed social ideal. In sharp
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contrast, dependence carries the stigma of needing assistance, having limited choice and 
being incapable. Furthermore, some factors thought to be highly influential, were rarely 
mentioned. For example, Keynes’ (1936) bequest motive that is often cited in the 
economic saving literature as a highly influential reason for saving was directly 
mentioned by only one participant.
Religious reasons were also cited. Three women cited a religious reason like:
I do have a spiritual side that says I have to be a good servant with whatever I’ve 
been given, (respondent 14, female, high saving)
My reasons follow more the Biblical line ... I definitely believe that God wants us 
to be good stewards of what He gives us” (respondent 21, female, low saving)
Conversely, it was predominantly males who cited a duty as family provider such as, “I 
guess when you get married, I think that I do perceive that I have an obligation to ensure 
my family’s financial security” (respondent 20, male, high saving). Among the 4 
respondents who did not express a moral obligation, some reasons were: “It’s more likely 
to be self-preservation than ethics” (respondent 7, male, low saving) and “I don’t feel bad 
about any type of thing I do financially. Not from a moral sense at least. To me it’s all 
numbers” (respondent 10, male, low saving).
Many participants cited the influence of marriage, employment, children, home- 
ownership, elder care and other demographic changes on saving. However, there were 
often more profound reasons for saving changes beyond simply entering a demographic 
life-stage. A recurring sub-text for saving was also maturation / adult-development and
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learning that accompanied or paralleled each life-stage. For example, two participants
making the transition to being new parents observe:
I’d say having kids also spurred on the need to have emergency funds. It’s not just 
[my husband] and I if  we screw up. (respondent 9, female, low saving)
I guess we save for different things. Where before it might have been for 
something for the house or something for [my husband] and now it’s more for 
[our daughter]. So I guess in that aspect, it’s changed our perspective and what we 
save for and what we don’t, (respondent 23, female, low saving)
Two recent college graduates making their transition into the workforce note:
.. .when you’re finally on your own and no longer under the umbrella o f your 
family and you have to earn for yourself -  you realize that you have to have a 
safety net (respondent 17, female, low saving)
I’ve come to respect how hard money is to earn! ... Living out on my own, I 
realize how hard it is to keep the money and to budget.. .In realizing how hard it is 
to earn, I’ve made a larger effort to put certain money aside every week, 
(respondent 22, male, low saving)
Other respondents phrased saving more directly in maturational terms:
Once you reach adulthood you achieve a certain maturity... and are probably 
saving for the same reasons ... a responsible, mature person saves whereas the
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opposite would be true of an irresponsible person.
(respondent 17, female, low saving)
.. .it revolves around what I consider an adult lifestyle 
(respondent 3, male, high saving)
In Warneryd’s (1999) psychological schema for saving behavior, he describes a 
necessary precedent for saving as a prompt to action. The person recognizes future needs 
and possibly inadequate future resources. However, this recognition “does not always or 
for every person trigger a prompt to action. Here the willpower or self-control or some 
other volitional concept comes in.” (Wameryd, 1999, p. 324). As participants described 
these transitions, the change in their saving approach followed a personal realization 
about the situation. Many of the realizations and subsequent saving changes were similar. 
For example, new parents felt an increased responsibility for their child’s future. Again, 
this is reminiscent o f development theories that demarcate growth stages by attaining 
certain skills, abilities or views. Simply shifting to a new demographic category or age 
group does not necessarily change one’s saving.
There was also an attributional interpretation of participants’ saving descriptions 
(Weiner, 1985). Three follow-up probes to the question “What do you think of when 1 
say saving” asked participants whether they felt saving is primarily intemal/extemal, 
stable/unstable and controllable/uncontrollable for an individual. The predominant theme 
was a personal attribution that saving was due to an internal (16), stable (16) and 
controllable (19) trait. Another theme was that a person attribution (Trope, 1986) seemed
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more prevalent in explaining others’ success at saving. Interestingly, when asked “why 
do some people save while others do not save”, participants tended to answer why people 
do not save. Twenty-three respondents offered reasons why people do not save as 
opposed to 18 respondents who gave reasons why people do save. Saving is the result of 
desire/priority/mindset (9), upbringing (8), self-control /delay of gratification (4) and 
conservative personality (4). The reasons cited for why others fail to save retained a trait 
flavor; no control impulsive (9), lack mental/planning ability (4). However, the reasons 
for not saving cited more situational factors: cannot afford/low income (5), lack 
education (5) and medical/financial hardship (4). Participants were willing to attribute 
saving success to desire (9) and upbringing (8), but apparently reluctant to equally 
attribute saving failure to lack of desire (2) and poor upbringing (3).
Social factors were a final source of influence both at a micro/personal and 
macro/societal level. As noted earlier, most participants’ approach to saving was self- 
taught and often self-motivated. For example, when asked what sources of information 
were used to make saving and investment decisions, participants preferred to conduct 
their own research (13), confer with friends or relatives (10), read magazines/newspapers 
(8) and get material from work or personal contacts (5) versus seeking professional help 
from lawyers, accountants, brokers, bankers, seminars or financial planners. While 
influences to save tended to be personal and one-to-one, influences to spend were often 
portrayed as societal.
The typical, average American is too far in debt, and the American way is to
spend and go into debt, (respondent 20, male, high saving)
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A lot of what society says is an “enjoy it while you have it” kind of philosophy.
Do it now. Live life to the fullest and that kind o f philosophy. And people do that. 
You know, they run up their credit eards and all those kind of things. They 
overspend and do all those things except saving. The materialism o f our world ... 
(respondent 21, female, low saving)
1 think the higgest thing is to get away from buying things because you want them 
versus because you need them. It’s all the fault of Madison Avenue. Just because 
somebody says it’s right, doesn’t make it right, (respondent 3, male, high saving)
The participants observed that while many social forces promoted and rewarded 
spending, there were not comparable efforts for saving. To expand on these qualitative 
findings. Study 2 provided quantitative results on a larger, nationally representative 
sample using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Discussion
The saving interviews in this study were informative both in what was said, and in 
what was noticeably absent (e.g., bequest motive). The purpose of this study was to 
explore and deseribe individuals’ experience o f saving in detail with respect to three 
primary questions:
1) Do self-depietions of saving differ between households who save more 
versus less than expected for their age and income? [group differences]
2) Do people describe their saving proeess as long-term and rational or 
short-term and heuristie? [saving process description]
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3) Is saving influenced by factors not explicit in either life cycle
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) or mental accounting theories (Shefrin 
& Thaler, 1988)? {additional saving factors]
A number of key themes emerged to answer these questions using Richie and Spencer’s 
(1994) qualitative framework analysis coding techniques.
First, self-depictions of saving exhibited subtle differences between households 
with high and low savings for their age and income using Stanley and Danko’s (1996) 
wealth scaling approach. While both groups tended to cite similar influences and reasons 
for saving, some differences in this small sample were observed. The high saving group 
was: older, had more children, spent less than income, preferred less risk, were more 
conservative, felt financially lucky, deliberately planned savings and personally 
conducted investment research. Men and women in the sample also differed in 
deliberately planning savings and using person attributions for others’ saving.
Second, strong support was evident for short-term, heuristic saving tied to current 
income. There were few people who claimed to have a life-span time horizon or perform 
complicated calculations for saving. The saving process description tended to follow the 
mental accounting model o f Shefrin and Thaler (1988).
Third, people reported influences outside the life cycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 
1954) and mental accounting models of saving (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). Emotion, 
personality and motivation were cited as important influences upon saving. There was 
also a strong ethical or moral rationale underlying saving. For some saving was socially 
responsible. Saving prevented one from being a burden on others. For some saving was 
spiritually responsible. It was important to be a good steward o f what one has been given
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and not waste it. For others saving was environmentally responsible. Conserving a natural 
resource ultimately meant saving money. Many respondents also spoke of not saving 
when young, and starting to save after learning saving was important or gaining assets / 
family responsibilities that prompted saving. Respondents who saved earlier often 
explained that someone had shown them saving was important earlier or had a pivotal 
early work experience:
.. .when I was a kid, I had my first business when I was 7 years old. I raised 
strawberries. I learned that if I wanted money in the world, I had to work for it 
and it was pretty dear! So, for things I wanted as a child, I would save that money 
until I bought it. .. .Consequently, we learned a work ethic more than anything 
else. To get anywhere you had to earn it. (respondent 19, male, high saving) 
Cohort, generational or life cycle effects, therefore, were potentially interpretable as 
differing stages o f financial maturity. Thus, an under-appreciated source of saving 
variation is adult-development. Regardless of demographics, the financial maturity that 
occurs for one person at seventeen years old might not occur for another until they are 
seventy. Participants also demonstrated attributional processes in separating causes for 
saving for oneself and others into personal/trait attributions (internal, stable, controllable) 
versus situational/state attributions (external, unstable, uncontrollable) (Weiner, 1985; 
Trope, 1986).
Finally, social influences such as peers, society, one’s upbringing and 
experiencing or witnessing a financial catastrophe were cited. Social factors that 
influenced one to save tended to be vivid personal experiences. Social factors that 
influenced one to spend were described as societal and pervasive. In sum, participants
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alluded to many additional factors and processes outside o f those described in the life 
cycle and mental accounting theories of saving they felt were influential. The study was 
limited in that the qualification as high or low saving was made by the researeher. Future 
qualitative research may pre-qualify participants more objectively regarding the level of 
their savings and use an in person interview approach instead of telephone.
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C H A P T E R  III
STUDY 2
The second study tested how well variables from mental-accounting psychology 
and life-cycle economics predicted relative saving levels (high versus low). The variables 
were derived from the economic life-cycle (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and the 
psychological mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) theories.
Beyond theories, there are pragmatic concerns in correctly classifying individuals’ 
saving and wealth. Kennickell (1999) described a problem in using income data to predict 
wealth for the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF used a list sample from 
income tax returns to stratify and seleet wealthy participants with a wealth index. The 
original wealth index (WINDEXO) used for the 1998 SCF was a model that scanned 
income data for signals of wealth such as interest, dividend, rent/royalty or business 
incomes and home equity. After discovering that WINDEXO miselassified many wealthy 
Amerieans on the Forbes 400 list, however, research was conducted to improve the 
wealth index. A second wealth index (WINDEXl) was constructed to include age, 
geographic location and other financial indices and the model produced an adjusted R 
square of 0.72. Sueh life-eyele demographic indices did separate the wealthy from the 
non-wealthy, but have difficulty discerning net worth differences within categories. For 
example, when the net worth and income ranks generated by WINDEXl were applied to 
the Forbes 400, the Spearman rank correlation is 0.35. Kennickell (1999) concluded, 
“Ultimately the functional relationship between income and wealth is difficult to
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estimate: typically, a log-linear regression of wealth on income, age and many other 
factors that are typically expected to explain the heterogeneity o f wealth holdings will 
have an R square of only about 0.70.” (p.8).
Taking cues from this and other saving studies (Bae, Hanna & Lindamood, 1997; 
Bernheim, Skinner & Weinberg, 1997; Chaulk, Johnson & Bulcroft, 2003; Chen, Hanna 
& Montalto, 1998; Hilgert, Hogarth & Beverly, 2003; Kennickell, 1995, 1999), this study 
analyzed nationwide survey data for differences between individuals with high and low 
savings. While Study 1 used detailed qualitative data to compare individuals with high 
and low savings; this study was a quantitative secondary analysis of personal interviews 
from a representative sample of 4,432 American households collected in the 2001 Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF). The primary research question was what variables 
separated people whose savings were high or low for their age and income? The 
following sections list hypotheses for the present study.
Life Cycle Hypothesis
The first hypothesis was that seven life cycle variables (age, income, children, 
consumption shocks, bequest motive, precautionary motive and future expectations) 
would predict high saving versus low saving. As described in the literature review, this 
hypothesis was derived mostly from Modigliani’s (1985) simple aggregate consumption 
function:
C = a Y L  + S W  
C = Consumption during a short-term period
a, S  = Demographic parameters o f length of life (age), retirement
YL = Income
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W  = Wealth
In the life-cycle hypothesis, individuals rationally estimated future wealth to optimize 
spending. If income exceeded the long-term level o f life resources (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954) or permanent income (Friedman, 1957), saving occurred. Bequest and 
precautionary motives, optimistic future expectations, entering middle age and having a 
high income were expected to be associated with higher saving. It was also expected that 
having children and consumption shocks would decrease saving.
Mental Accounting Hypothesis
The second hypothesis was that seven mental accounting variables (regular 
saving, number of asset accounts, current asset / income ratio, future asset / income ratio, 
home ownership, estimated savings needs and credit use) would predict high saving 
versus low saving. This hypothesis was derived predominantly from Shefrin and Thaler’s 
(1988) description of saving:
C= f ( l  A, F) and 
1 ~ 8C/57 > bC/?)A > 5C/DF ~ 0 
C = Consumption during a short term period 
/  = Current income account
A = Current asset accounts
F = Future asset accounts 
Spending was a function of current income, current assets and future assets defined by an 
inequality where income was most likely to be spent, current assets less likely and future 
assets least likely. It was expected that a regular saving plan, a higher number o f asset 
accounts, higher future and current asset to income ratios along with estimated saving
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needs would be associated with high saving. Home ownership and not using credit should
also separate high versus low saving groups.
Life Cycle vs. Mental Accounting Hypothesis.
It was hypothesized that two separate models (life cycle and mental accounting) 
with a similar number of predictors would differ significantly in their ability to predict 
high saving versus low saving. It was expected that both life cycle and mental accounting 
variables would provide significant factors for predicting high saving versus low saving.
It was also expected that a life cycle model would have larger effects than a mental 
accounting model.
Life Cycle with Mental Accounting Hypothesis.
It was hypothesized that a model that combined life cycle and mental accounting 
factors (14 variables) would improve the prediction of high and low savings beyond the 
level o f either model alone. It was expected that the life cycle variables would have the 
largest effects and precede the entry of mental accounting factors in stepwise models. It 
was also expected that mental accounting factors would have significant effects that 
would improve the model.
Method
Sample Selection. This study used secondary data from the 2001 United States’ 
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). To select participants, the 
SCF used multi-stage sampling with an area probability sample for the general population 
of the United States and a list sample derived from tax records for wealthy respondents. 
This methodology has provided a representative American sample especially among 
wealthy respondents. In the 2001 SCF, there were 4,442 completed interviews. Of these.
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2,917 families came from the area probability sample and 1,532 came from the list 
sample. The response rate for the area probability sample was 68% and 30% for the list 
sample. For the wealthiest families on the list sample, the response rate was 10% 
(Bledsoe, 2003).
Participants. There were 4,442 heads of households (78% male, 22% female) 
who elected to participate in the 2001 SCF. Participation was voluntary and not 
compensated. Ages ranged from 18 to 95 (M = 50.22, SD -  16.12). Incomes ranged from 
$0 to $111 million (M = $67,998, SE = $1,800, Mdn = $39,928) and participants’ total 
net worth ranged from -$116,000 to $586 million (M = $395,000, SE  = $10,500, Mdn = 
$86,100) (Aizcorbe, Kennickell & Moore, 2003). The sample contained White (81%), 
Black (10%), Hispanic (6%) and Asian/American Indian/Pacific Islander (3%) 
respondents. Married respondents predominated (61%), followed by divorced (13%), 
never married (12%), widowed (7%), living with partner (6%) and separated (1%). Over 
half the 2001 SCF sample (56%) had no children while 44% had one or more children (M 
= Q.9,SD = \ . n , M d n  = 0).
Materials. The Survey of Consumer Finances is detailed in three downloadable 
fdes. The files downloaded were the Survey of Consumer Finances 2001 codebook 
(2003, June 8), the Map of Variables (2003, June 8), and a copy of the computer-assisted 
personal interviewing (CAPI) program or CAPI file (2003, September 8). For Study 2, all 
question wording and responses referred to the SCF 2001 codebook (2003, June 8).
The triennial SCF has been conducted since 1963 by the United States Federal 
Reserve Board to assess American finances conducted in 2001 by the University of 
Chicago’s NORC. The SCF is a 90-minute, in-person interview that contains over 500
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separate items. Extensive questions probe eurrent finaneial assets (including inheritance 
and family transfers) and non-fmancial assets (housing, other properties, businesses, 
vehicles). The SCF examines liabilities in depth (education, mortgage, credit cards) as 
well as attitudes (financial institutions, credit, saving). Respondents’ employment history 
(job status, type work, title, hours, salary, benefit plans) and income is thoroughly 
examined both for respondents and their spouses / family members. Finally, 
demographics are collected as point and range estimates (age, income) and categorical 
variables (sex, race). Table 15 describes the overall structure o f the SCF.
Variable Selection. This section outlines the rationale for selecting the life cycle 
and mental accounting variables used in this study. As seen in Table 1, eeonomic and 
psyehological saving theories presented divergent pictures of who should and should not 
be proficient at saving. The present study used variables extrapolated from the life cycle 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) theories 
and gauged how well these variables separated those with relatively high versus low 
saving. Therefore, variables for this study were organized as roughly falling underneath 
the headings of life cycle, or mental accounting.
Life-Cycle Variables. There were seven primary variables selected from economic 
life-cycle theories: income, age, children, future expectations, consumption shocks, 
bequest and preeautionary. The type of variable, corresponding SCF questions and 
proeedure that created each variable are specified in Table 16.
The life cycle theory described by Modigliani & Brumberg (1954) can be reduced 
to a smaller set of key factors and concepts. The hump shaped age / income profile 
associated with the life cycle hypothesis indicated most saving coincides with peak
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Table 15
Study 2: Structure o f  the Survey o f  Consumer Finances (SCF)
Section Questions Description o f Section
Introduction 8 Demographics
A 40 Finaneial Institutions
B 15 Credit and credit eards
D 68 Housing
E 37 Other properties
F 22 Businesses
G 40 Vehicles
H 21 Education loans
I 56 Financial assets
J 21 Savings attitudes
R 100 Employment
T 40 Income
X 12 Inheritance and interfamily transfers
Y 40 Demographics
Z 20 Interviewers Observations
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Table 16
Study 2: Life Cycle Variables from the Survey o f  Consumer Finances (SCF)
Variable Type Description Source
Age Continuous Age in years SCF extract (age)
Income Continuous Income in dollars SCF extract (income)
Kids Categorical Number of children SCF extract (kids)
Shock' Continuous Number of spending shocks SCF (see note)
Bequest^ Continuous Bequest importance (5 pt) SCF (x5824)
Precautionary Categorical Precautionary saving (0,1) SCF extract (hsavrsV)
Expectations^ Catego rical Future expectations (4 pt) SCF (see note)
'  S H O C K  =  s u m  o f  d u m m y  c o d e  l = p r e s e n t ,  0 = a b s e n t  f o r :  x 7 3 7 2  ( d i v o r c e d ,  s e p a r a t e d ,  w i d o w e d ) ,  x 4 1 0 0  ( l a i d  o f f ,  
u n e m p l o y e d ,  d i s a b l e d ) ,  x 6 7 7 2  ( b a n k r u p t ) ,  x 6 0 3 0  ( r e s p o n d e n t  i s  i n  p o o r  h e a l t h ) ,  x 6 1 2 4  ( s p o u s e  i s  i n  p o o r  h e a l t h )  o r  
x 7 3 9 7  ( h a v e  n o  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e ) ,  e . g . ,  f o r  a  d i v o r c e d ,  u n e m p l o y e d ,  d i s a b l e d  r e s p o n d e n t ,  S H O C K  = 3 .
^  B E Q U E S T  =  r e c o d e d  l = V e r y  i m p o r t a n t ,  5 = N o t  a t  a l l  i m p o r t a n t  t o  l = N o t  a t  a l l  i m p o r t a n t ,  5 = V e r y  i m p o r t a n t
^ E X P E C T A T I O N S  =  s u m  o f  d u m m y  c o d e  l = e x p e c t  b e t t e r ,  0 = e x p e c t  w o r s e ;  x 3 0 1  ( f u t u r e  e c o n o m y )  +  x 3 0 2  ( f u t u r e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e )  +  x 3 0 2 3  ( f u t u r e  r e t i r e m e n t )  +  x 7 3 6 4  ( f u t u r e  i n c o m e  l e v e l ) .
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earnings {income) during middle age {age). A larger number o f children (children) were 
also assumed to decrease saving (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). As seen in the 
literature review, the life cycle hypothesis and the Euler equation in use today focused 
upon dynamic factors that changed over time along with the subjective expectations 
surrounding these changes and how they would affect spending (e.g., income / expected 
income, age / expected lifespan, children / expected family size). Many demographic 
factors like sex and race remain constant over time; therefore, they were not included. To 
set a spending level, the individual rationally optimized the dynamic factors. Spending 
was then adjusted according to expectations about future income, interest rates and the 
economy (future expectations). Contemporary research has also explored the effects of 
consumption shocks (consumption shocks) and motives to leave a bequest to heirs 
(bequest) or build up a precautionary buffer stock for emergencies (precautionary) 
(Browning & Lusardi, 1996). Again, in oversimplified terms, consumption shocks 
decreased saving and bequest / precautionary motives increased saving.
Mental Accounting Variables. Comparable with the life cycle variables, there 
were seven variables generated from mental accounting psychology: regular saving, 
future asset account, current asset account, number of asset accounts, house, saving 
estimate and credit use. The type of variable, corresponding SCF questions and procedure 
that created each variable are specified in Table 17.
The mental accounting theory of Shefrin and Thaler (1988) can also be condensed 
into a few key variables and concepts. Reducing the cognitive effort necessary to control 
spending is central to mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). As participants in 
Study 1 observed, pre-commitment heuristics that automated saving decisions minimized
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Table 17
Study 2: Mental Accounting Variables from  the Survey o f  Consumer Finance (SCF)
Variable Type Description Source
Regular Categorical Save regularly (0,1) SCF (x3020)
Accounts' Continuous Number of asset accounts SCF (see note)
Current^ Continuous Ratio current assets /income SCF extract (see note)
Future^ Continuous Ratio future assets /income SCF extract (see note)
House Categorical Have house (0,1) SCF extract (housed)
Estimate'' Continuous Ratio est. savings /income SCF (see note)
Credit Use^ Categorical Level of credit use (3 pt) SCF extract (see note)
' A C C O U N T S  =  s u m  o f  d u m m y  c o d e  l = p r e s e n t ,  0 = a b s e n t  f o r :  b o n d  ( b o n d s ) ,  c d s  ( c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  d e p o s i t ) ,  c h e c k  
( c h e c k i n g  a c c o u n t ) ,  d b p l n t  ( d e f i n e d  b e n e f i t  p l a n ) ,  m m a  ( m o n e y  m a r k e t ) ,  o t h f i n  ( o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l ) ,  o t h m a  ( o t h e r  m a n a g e d  
a s s e t s ) ,  a n y p e n  ( p e n s i o n ) ,  s a v i n g  ( s a v i n g  a c c o u n t ) ,  s a v b n d  ( s a v i n g  b o n d ) ,  s t o c k s  ( e q u i t i e s ) ,  c a s h l i  ( c a s h  v a l u e  l i f e  
i n s u r a n c e ) .
^ C U R R E N T  =  L I Q  ( t o t a l  l i q u i d  a s s e t s )  /  n r m i n c .  L I Q  =  v a l u e  o f  c h e c k i n g ,  s a v i n g s ,  m o n e y  m a r k e t  a n d  c a l l  a c c o u n t s .
^ F U T U R E  =  R E T L I Q  ( t o t a l  q u a s i - l i q u i d  a s s e t s )  /  n r m i n c .  R E T L I Q  =  v a l u e  o f  I R A s ,  t h r i f t  a c c o u n t s ,  a n d  f u t u r e  
p e n s i o n s .
'' E S T I M A T E  =  x 7 1 8 7  ( e s t i m a t e  o f  s a v i n g s  n e e d e d )  /  n r m i n c .
^ C R E D I T U S E  =  s u m  o f  d u m m y  c o d e  l = p r e s e n t ,  0 = a b s e n t  f o r :  C C B A L  ( h a v e  c r e d i t  c a r d  b a l a n c e )  +  H D E B T  ( h a v e  
a n y  d e b t ) .
92
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
cognitive effort/self-control necessary for saving (see also Bach, 2003). Thus, it was 
expected that people saving a regular amount on a regular schedule automated some 
aspect of the decision and would exhibit higher savings than those saving irregular 
amounts on irregular schedules (regular saving).
As observed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000) and Minehart, Bowman and 
Rabin (1999), risky decisions were evaluated from a reference point often framed in the 
eontext of a current situation. Spending has been shown to be hypersensitive to current 
income, and current income often acts a reference point for spend/save decisions 
(Bemheim, Skinner & Weinberg, 1997; Thaler, 1999a). It was expected then, that a 
person’s estimated saving needs for the future divided by their reference point o f current 
income would provide an indicator to separate high and low saving (estimated saving). In 
contrast, life cycle consumption decisions are primarily made according to a rational 
assessment of aggregated wealth, demographics (e.g., expected lifespan) and future 
expectations. In the life cycle model, the rational consumer “will choose to eonsume at a 
reasonably stable rate, close to his antieipated average life consumption” and saving 
depends upon “the extent to which current income departs from average life resources” 
(Modigliani, 1985, p.299).
Also according to Shefrin and Thaler (1988), there were three primary mental 
accounts that each had a different marginal propensity to consume (MFC): current 
income (MPC=1), current assets (0 < MFC < 1) and future assets (MFC=0). All current 
ineome was assumed to be spent, but the temptation to spend eurrent assets and future 
assets was lower or nonexistent. As observed by the participants in Study 1, the 
temptation to spend an asset was related to the extent it was available/visible and ready to
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be spent (in cash). Liquid assets (cash, money market, etc) were ready to spend. Illiquid 
assets (401k, cash value life insurance, pension, etc.) required a lengthy and sometimes 
costly procedure to turn them into cash. As a result, an implication of mental accounting 
was that saving reduced to a person’s success in transferring liquid current income into 
less liquid current and future assets. Asset liquidity, therefore, was used as a proxy for 
placement in the mental accounts of income, current assets and future assets. Therefore, it 
was expected that the proportion of future assets (future asset account) and current assets 
(current asset account) to an individual’s reference point of current income would 
separate high and low saving.
Another important aspect of mental accounting is separating and labeling assets 
(Thaler, 1994). Separating and labeling assets in many ways resembles a practiced skill 
or expertise (Shanteau, 1992). For example, when physics experts and novices were 
asked to label and separate physics problems written on index cards by the approach that 
could be used to solve them, the arrangements were very different. Experts' problem piles 
were arranged on the basis of theoretical principles while novices' piles were arranged by 
the problems' surface attributes (Chi et ah, 1981). Therefore, it was expected that a 
person who has created and funded a larger network of asset accounts would have a 
higher net worth than someone matched by age and income with fewer accounts (number 
o f  asset accounts). Recall that for a life-cycle rational consumer, the number o f accounts 
should not matter because assets are fungible and pooled together to set a spending level 
(Thaler, 1990).
The labeling of an asset similarly should not matter (Thaler, 1999). When 
rationally optimized, housing equity of $100,000 should be equivalent to $100,000 cash.
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However, in Study 1, homes figured prominently in participants’ past, present and future 
saving plans and were described differently than other assets. Despite being most 
families’ single largest asset, home equity is underutilized for spending and funding 
retirement (Venti & Wise, 1989). An asset labeled “house” appears more likely to be 
considered off limits to spending. Thus, regardless of outstanding mortgage, having a 
house (home) was expected to separate high and low savings.
Finally, consumer borrowing was considered in the life cycle subject to external 
liquidity constraints (e.g., getting turned down for a loan by a bank). However, the mental 
accounting view was that people internally self-restricted and did not borrow up to their 
limit (i.e., display debt aversion). People’s different level of credit use provided another 
means to separate high and low savings (credit use).
Data Preparation. First, the Survey of Consumer Finances public data set SAS 
export (2004, March 27) and public data extract in Microsoft Excel (2004, March 27) 
were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Board. Each file was opened with SPSS v l 1.5.1 
and converted into separate SPSS .sav files. To correct for nonresponse error, missing 
values in the SCF are estimated and imputed five times (Kennickell, 1998) yielding 5 
values for every respondent in the data file or 22,210 cases. The full public data set has 
5,306 variables consisting of both raw variables (denoted with a ‘j ’) and the same 
variables formatted and recoded for analysis (denoted with an ‘x ’). The extract data set 
contains all 94 computed variables used in Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore (2003) to 
report the SCF results.
Second, the full public data set and extract were combined into a single file using 
the SPSS merge files function breaking on the unique case identifier (SCF variable yyl).
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Merging the files resulted in 22,210 cases and 5,400 variables. Cases at the beginning and 
end of the files were checked to confirm that the combined file preserved the original 
values and order.
Finally, to allow better comparison of individual cases, the imputed values were 
removed by calculating the mean across the unique case identifier (y l) using the SPSS 
aggregate function. In cases where a value was missing, the mean o f the five imputed 
values became the new value. In cases where the value was not missing, the mean simply 
duplicated and preserved the original value. This procedure created a combined file of 
5,400 variables and 4,442 cases corresponding to the actual interviews. The means on key 
variables for the combined file were compared with the original files and the values 
matched. Values for a sample of individual cases between the three files were also 
checked and found to correspond. The aggregated file containing 5,400 variables and 
4,442 cases was used in all subsequent analyses.
Exploratory data analysis was conducted on key variables used to calculate the 
saving index variable: age, income and net worth. There were 20 cases with zero income. 
For these cases, the values were replaced with the normal income adjusted to survey year 
(norminc). Seven of the cases did not have normal income either, so cases 36, 527, 1001, 
1700, 1951, 2017, 2907 were removed as outliers. An additional 3 cases, 30, 3594 and 
4271 were removed as outliers due to large imbalances between income and net worth. 
The total number of cases after removal of outliers was 4,432.
Operational Definition o f  Saving. In oversimplified terms, the two primary 
operational definitions of saving were residual income (income -  expenses) at the end of 
the current period, and increased net worth (assets -  debts) between two periods
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(Warneryd, 1999). To create an income surplus in the eurrent period, savers either 
increased income or deereased expenses. To inerease net worth between two periods, 
savers either inereased assets or decreased debts. These definitions differed according to 
variables measured, time horizon and number o f measurements. Residual income 
occurred in one period and only one measurement of income and expenses was required. 
Net worth gain was intertemporal and required a before and after measurement of assets 
and debts. Thus, the question was whieh definition would best separate those with high 
saving levels versus low saving levels?
The operational definition of saving used in this study was a compromise. 
Sueeessful saving was defined as a high net-worth for one’s age and income less 
inheritances. The SCF was eomprehensive in collecting financial data and well suited to 
caleulating net worth. However, raw net worth values did not necessarily indieate saving 
proficieney. For example, two people may each have a net worth of $100,000, but this 
may be relatively low or high for that age and ineome. Stanley and Danko (1996) 
identified wealthy individuals by scaling expected net worth by (age x income less 
inheritance)/10 and subtracting actual net worth:
(Age * Ineome)
10 - Actual Net Worth
For example, a 50 year-old with $50,000 income would have an expected net worth of 
$250,000. Stanley and Danko (1996) created three net worth groups: a top quartile or two 
times expected net worth (prodigious accumulator o f wealth), the middle 50 percent 
(average accumulator o f wealth) and a bottom quartile or one-half expected net worth 
(under aecumulator of wealth). An extension of this seale is detailed in the next section.
97
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Creating a Saving Index Variable and Saving Quartiles. In their report on the 
2001 SCF results, Aizcorbe, Kennickell & Moore (2003) removed outliers and weighted 
raw values on most financial measures. As noted in Kennickell (2001), the distribution of 
American wealth was highly skewed and the SCF sample mirrors this characteristic. 
Linear models, such as regression and ANOVA, which assume linearity, a normal 
distribution and homoscedasticity would be especially influenced by the skewed wealth 
distribution and presence of outliers. Weighting reduced the influence of the small 
nonrandom sample of wealthy households upon the larger random sample. Flowever, 
weighting or excluding wealthy individuals could eliminate variation important to 
understanding saving.
Although previous research has made use of ratios and indexes to study saving 
(e.g., Bae, Hanna & Lindamood, 1997; Bemheim, Skiimer 8c Weinberg, 1997), a new 
saving index was used in this study. Stanley and Danko’s (1996) index was modified 
from being a difference score to a ratio. Actual net worth less inheritance was divided by 
expected net worth as calculated by age multiplied by normal income divided by 10:
Actual Net Worth -  Inheritance 
(Age * Normal Income)/10
To create the saving index in the aggregated SPSS file, actual net worth less inheritance
(SCF variables x5804 + x5809 + x5814 + x5818) was divided by expected net worth
(age*nrminc)/10). Next, the saving index variable was rank ordered from highest to
lowest. This converted the continuous saving index data into an ordinal ranking. The
rank ordered saving index was then split into quartiles using the mean for ties. The SCF
components o f the saving index, life cycle variables and mental accounting variables are
summarized in Table 18.
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Table 18
Study 2: Survey o f  Consumer Finances (SCF) Variables Used in the Dependent (DV)
and Independent (IV) Measures
Saving Index (DV)* Life Cycle (IV) Mental Accounting (IV)
Actual Net Worth (assets -  debts) 
CHECK (checking account value)* 
SAVING (saving account value)* 
MMA (money market value)* 
CALL (call account value)*
CDS (certificate of deposit value) 
NMMF (mutual funds value) 
STOCKS (equities value)
BOND (bonds value)
IRAKH (IRA, Keogh value)* 
THRIFT (401k, 403b, etc. value)* 
FUTPEN (pension value)* 
SAVBND (saving bonds value) 
CASHLI (cash value insurance) 
OTHMA (other managed assets) 
OTHFIN (other financial assets) 
VEHIC (value o f vehicles) 
HOUSES (value o f residence) 
ORESRE (other residential) 
NNRESRE (nonresidential)
BUS (net business assets) 
OTHNFIN (other nonfinancial) 
MRTHEL (housing debt)
RESDBT (other property debt) 
CCBAL (credit card debt) 
INSTALL (installment debt) 
ODEBT (other debt)
Inheritance 
x5804 (T ‘ inheritance value) 
x5809 (2"** inheritance value) 
x5814 (S"^** inheritance value) 
x58I8 (all other inheritances value)
Expected Net Worth (agex income)/] 0 
AGE (respondent’s age in yrs)* 
NRMINC (normal income)*
Age
AGE (respondent’s age in yrs)* 
Income
NRMINC (normal income)*
Number o f  children 
KIDS (number of children)
Consumption Shock 
x7373 (divorce, separated, widow) 
x4100 (laid off, disabled, unempl.) 
x6772 (declared bankruptcy) 
x6030 (poor health respondent) 
x6124 (poor health spouse) 
x7397 (no health insurance)
Bequest Motive
x5824 (importance o f bequest)
Precautionary Motive 
HSAVRS 7 (save for emergency)
Future Expectations 
x301 (future economy) 
x302 (future interest rate) 
x3023 (future retirement) 
x7364 (future income level)
Save Regularly 
x3020 (save regularly)
Number o f  Accounts 
HBOND (have bonds)
HCDS (have cert o f deposit) 
HCHECK (have checking act) 
HDBPLNT (have DB plan) 
HMMA (have money mkt) 
HOTHFIN (have other fin.) 
HOTMA (have managed asset) 
HANYPEN (have pension) 
HSAVING (have saving act) 
HSAVBND (have saving bnd) 
HSTOCKS (have equities) 
HCASHLl (have cash life ins.)
Current (LIQ/NRMINC) 
CHECK (checking account)* 
SAVING (saving account)* 
MMA (money market)*
CALL (call account)* 
NRMINC (normal income)*
Future (RETLIQ/NRMINC) 
IRAKH (IRA, Keogh)* 




x7187 (est. savings needed) 
NRMINC (normal income)*
Credit use
HCCBAL (have credit bal) 
HDEBT (have any debt)
House
HOUSECL (have house)
Note. Independent variables and components o f the dependent variable are italicized. Variables from the 
SCF extract data set are capitalized. Variables from the SCF data set are enumerated.
Indicates variable used in DV and IV
' Saving Index = {actual net worth -  inheritance) / expected net worth
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Data Analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated on each variable by saving 
index quartile (high saving, upper middle, lower middle, low saving). To confirm 
whether the life cycle and mental accounting variables were different for each quartile of 
the saving index, two factorial MANOVAs were run for the continuous life cycle 
variables and mental accounting variables by saving index quartile. Post hoc contrasts 
were performed to discern which levels of the saving index differed significantly from 
one another. Pearson chi-square tests were also run to test for differences on categorical 
variables by level o f the saving index.
To test the hypotheses regarding the ability o f life cycle and mental accounting 
variables to predict high and low saving, three stepwise binomial logistic regressions 
were then conducted on the saving index (life cycle, mental accounting, and the life cycle 
and mental accounting combined model). This approach fit a number of characteristics of 
the data (non-normal and heteroscedastic) and would fit a prediction model to a 
dichotomous outcome variable (high vs. low saving). Logistic regression does not 
assume a normal distribution for dependent variables, nor a linear relation and 
homoscedasticity between dependent variables. Logistic regression allows a mixture of 
categorical and continuous variables and applies the maximum likelihood estimation after 
transforming a dependent variable into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds that a 
case falls in one category of the dependent versus another). The logit model assesses the 
effect o f each predictor, the significance of the predictors’ collective effect on the 
outcome, the probability for membership in dependent groups and the correct and 
incorrect classification of cases into dependent groups (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).
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Following Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1989) recommendations, a balance needed to 
be struck between sample size (power) and variables. Parsimonious models required 
fewer variables:
A general goal o f regression then, might be to select the fewest IVs necessary to 
provide a good prediction of a DV where each IV predicts a substantial and 
independent segment of variability in the DV (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989, p. 128) 
Therefore, a minimal number of initial regression predictor variables (seven) were 
selected for the life cycle and mental accounting models based upon the literature for 
expected effectiveness in predicting saving. As a guide, when using a stepwise technique, 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) recommended 40 cases per independent variable. This is 
increased if the variables are not normally distributed and transformations are not done. 
At the same time, given a sample size greater than 4,000 in SCF, many tests would create 
significant differences with negligible effect sizes:
For both statistical and practical reasons, then, one wants to measure the smallest 
number o f cases that has a decent chance of revealing a significant relationship if, 
indeed, one is there (Tabachnick & Fidell, 129).
Therefore MANOVA tests for variable differences by saving index quartiles were 
conducted using the entire data set (n=4,432). However, predictive models were done 
with only the high and low saving groups (n=2,216). This also created the binomial 
outcome variable required for logistic regression.
Results
Saving Index. Exploratory data analysis on the saving index (actual net worth -  
inheritance / expected net worth) indicated the presence of many high net-worth outliers
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that skewed the saving index distribution from normal. The saving index ratios ranged 
from -3.16 (3 times below expectation) to 166.47 (167 times above expectation) (M = 
1.79, SD = 5.65, Mdn = 0.65). These values were rank ordered and quartiles were created 
from the rank order. Each saving index quartile had 1,108 members. The bottom 25 
percent or low saving group’s actual net worth was only 0.17 of expected net worth. 
Those between the 26* and 50* percentiles or the lower middle group had an actual to 
expected net worth ratio between 0.18 and 0.64. The upper middle group in the 5 E ^ o  
74* percentile had an actual to expected net worth ratio between 0.65 and 1.73. The top 
25 percent or high saving group had an actual to expected net worth ratio o f 1.74 or more.
The means and standard deviations for the life cycle variables are presented in 
Table 19. A factorial MANOVA was performed with the saving index quartiles as the 
independent variables and the following life cycle measures: income, age, bequest and 
consumption shock. The combined dependent measures were affected by saving index 
level (F  (21, 12,698) = 75.3,p  <.001, r)  ^= .106). The life cycle variable for age had the 
largest effect size (F =  253.2 (3, 4428),/) <.001, r|^=.146), while the other effect sizes for 
shocks (F=  112.1 (3, 4428),/? <.001, ^^=.071), income (F =  52.5 (3, 4428),/? <.001, 
ri^=.034), and bequest (F =  27.4 (3, 4428),/? <.001, ri^=.018) were much smaller.
Post hoc contrasts showed that age and consumption shocks varied significantly for each 
saving quartile. Higher saving was generally associated with older participants, and 
consumption shocks were significantly more common in the low saving quartile. The 
high saving quartile was more optimistic about the future and valued leaving a bequest 
more than all three other quartiles. The income of the high saving group and upper 
middle groups was significantly higher than the lower middle and low saving groups.
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Table 19
















Age 57.51" 54.29 *’ 47.60" 41.50“
(14.20) (14.76) (14.96) (15.76)
Bequest 3.57" 3.17 3.05 3.09
(1.46) (1.49) (1.52) (1.55)
Normal Income 831,295" 574,369*’ 189,414" 47,026"
(2,041,733) (2,427,731) (849,341) (203,538)
Shocks .24" .34*’ .45" .73“
(0.49) (0.58) (0.66) (0.85)
a , b , c , d Different superscripts indicate significant group in row p <.001
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The categorical variables also demonstrated similar differences across the saving 
index. Pearson chi-square analyses were conducted for expectations, children, and 
precautionary saving. The future expectation variable illustrated similar distributions 
across quartiles with the exception that high saving people tended to rate their future 
expectations more optimistically than the low saving group (x = 39.56 (12),/? <.001). 
The distribution of children across quartiles was significantly different (x = 1.26 (12),/? 
> .05). Lower middle people had the highest number of children and the high saving had 
the fewest. In sum, these results confirmed that the saving index quartiles did 
differentiate people across the life cycle variables with the exception of the precautionary 
saving variable.
Means and standard deviations for the mental accounting variables are presented 
in Table 20. Factorial MANOVAs were performed with the saving index quartiles as the 
independent variables and the following mental accounting variables as dependent 
measures: asset accounts, current assets / income, future assets / income and estimated 
saving needs / income. Significant differences on the saving index overall were observed 
(F(21, 12,698) = 232.8,/? <.001, = .268). The univariate tests also indicated
significant effects for all four variables. The number of asset accounts (F = 567.7 (3, 
4428),/? <.001, q^=.278), and future assets (F =  235.6 (3, 4428),/? <.001, q^=.138) made 
the largest contributions to predicting differences on the saving index variable, as 
measured by the partial eta squared effect size. Current assets (F=  61.3 (3, 4428),/? 
<.001, q^=.040) and the saving estimate (F =  22.3 (3, 4428),/? <.001, q^=.015) were also 
significant.
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Table 20
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations o f  Mental Accounting Variables on the Saving 
Index
Saving Index
Life Cycle High Upper Lower Low
Variable Saving Middle Middle Saving
(n=l,108) (n=l,108) (n=l,108) (n=l,108)
Accounts 5.09" 4.70*’ 3.89'’ 2.14'*
(1.98) (1.92) (1.79) (1.60)
Current Assets 1.27" .39*’ .18*’'’ .05'’
(4.60) (0.63) (0.39) (0.13)
Future Assets 1.64" .86*’ .31'’ .05'*
(2.74) (1.17) (0.47) (0.40)
Saving Estimate .95" .57*’ .33*’'’ .27“
(3.15) (2.31) (1.51) (1.10)
’®’ Different superscripts indicate significant group in row p <.001
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Post hoc analysis o f the saving index quartiles on the combined dependent 
variables indicated that both the number of asset accounts and the future asset to income 
ratio increased significantly in step with the saving index quartiles. High saving 
individuals (M= 5.09, SD=l.9S) had almost three more accounts than low saving 
individuals (M= 2.14, SD = \.60). The ratio of future assets to income between the low 
saving (M= 0.05, 5'Z)=0.40) and high saving quartiles (M= 1.27, 5'D=4.60) also 
illustrated large differences. The upper and lower middle and low saving / lower middle 
quartiles had significantly lower current assets and estimated saving needs than the high 
saving group.
For the categorical variables, Pearson chi-square tests indicated significant
9 9differences in the use o f credit (x = 452.7 (6),p  <.001), home ownership (x = 1,965.6 
(3), p <.001), and saving regularly (x^ = 177.2 (3),p  <.001) across the saving index 
quartiles. Credit use was different for every quartile, but generally arranged in a 
progression of less credit with higher saving and more credit use with lower saving. The 
high and upper middle saving groups were significantly more likely to be home owners, 
than the lower middle and low saving groups. Finally, the save regularly variable 
illustrated a similar pattern for every quartile except the low saving group which was 
considerable less likely to save regularly than the other quartiles.
Life Cycle Hypothesis. Next, a stepwise binomial logistic regression of the seven 
life cycle variables was tested on the saving index outcome measure for just the high and 
low saving quartiles. The second hypothesis was that seven life cycle variables (age, 
income, children, consumption shocks, bequest motive, precautionary motive and future 
expectations) would predict high saving versus low saving.
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The logistic regression results displayed in Table 21 supported the life cycle 
hypothesis. The model selected five variables (by order of entry: age, income, shocks, 
bequest, expectations) and excluded two (kids, precautionary). The model’s prediction 
equation was Y = -4.65 + 0.074 (age) -1.26 (shock) + 0 (income) + 0.198 (bequest) + 
0.155 (expectations). Holding the effect of income constant, increases in age, the rated 
importance of a bequest and having optimistic future expectations increased the odds 
ratio of being high saving. However, each additional consumption shock decreased the 
odds o f being high saving by -1.26 for an odds ratio of .284 or a 71% percent decrease in 
odds o f being high saving (100 *(odds ratio -  1). The overall model was significant (x^ = 
1,391.4 (5) p  <.001). The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test for whether the 
model fit the observed data indicated a good fit for the five factors (x = 886.4 (8), p  
<.001). The Nagelkerke pseudo was 0.622, which was lower but relatively comparable 
with the R of .70 found in previous research (Kennickell, 1999). The classification plots 
displayed in Figure 1 indicated correct classification of 88.5% of low saving, 81.6% of 
high saving and an 85.1% overall correct classification.
Mental Accounting Hypothesis. A second stepwise binomial logistic regression 
was conducted for the seven mental accounting variables on the high and low saving 
quartiles. The second hypothesis was that seven mental accounting variables (regular 
saving, number o f asset accounts, current asset / income ratio, future asset / income ratio, 
home ownership, estimated savings needs and debt aversion) would have significant and 
additive effects in predicting high saving versus low saving. This model provided a 
surprisingly good fit to the data. The Nagelkerke pseudo R^ for the mental accounting 
variables was .83.
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Table 21
Study 2: Logistic Regression Predicting High v^ '. Low Saving with Life Cycle Variables
Logit estimates Number of observations =2216
L R x^(5) =1391.47
Log likelihood = 1680.56
Pseudo = .622
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald R Odds
Age .074 .004 308.78 (1) <.001 1.07
Shocks -1.26 .109 134.70(1) <.001 .284
Income .000 .000 103.02(1) <.001 1.00
Bequest .198 .041 23.371 (1) <.001 1.22
Future expectations .155 .076 4.14(1) <.05 1.17
Constant -4.66 .269 299.41
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Figure 1. Comparison o f initial and final life cycle classifications
Initial Life Cycle Model (n=2,216): 
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Final Life Cycle Model (R  ^= .622, n=2,216) 
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Predicted Probability is of Membership for High Saving 
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Symbols: L - Low Saving 
H - High Saving
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As seen in Table 22, the logistic regression results supported the mental 
accounting hypothesis. The forward conditional stepwise model selected five variables 
(by order o f entry: home, accounts, credit use, future assets, current assets) and excluded 
two (regular saving, saving estimate). The model’s prediction equation was Y = -3.73 + 
3.48 (home) + 0.469 (accounts) -1.14 (credit use) -i- 1.40 (future assets) + 3.58 (current 
assets). The effect of having a home inereased the odds of being high saving by 32.6 
times. An increase in the assets to income ratio of 0 to 1.0 also was a significant predictor 
raising the odds of being high saving by 4 times for future assets and by 36 times for 
current assets. Each additional asset account increased the odds o f being high saving by 
1.5 times. However, using credit decreased the odds o f being high saving by -1.14 for an 
odds ratio of .318 or a 68% percent decrease in odds of being high saving. The overall 
model was significant (x  = 2,174.5 (5) p  <.001). The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness 
o f fit test for whether the model fits the observed data indicated a good fit for the five 
factors (x  = 6,272.5 (8),/? <.001). The classification plots displayed in Figure 2 
indicated correct classification of 92.5% of low saving, 92.8% of high saving and an 
92.6% overall correct classification.
Life Cycle vs. Mental Accounting Hypothesis. The third hypothesis was that the life cycle 
and mental accounting models would not be equally effective in predicting high versus 
low saving. Comparisons of the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit statistics for the
9 9mental accounting model (x  = 6,272.5 (8),x> <.001) and the life cycle model (x  = 886.4 
(8),/) <.001) indicated they were not equivalent models which supported the life cycle 
versus mental accounting comparison hypothesis. Further, the -2  log likelihood (-2LL), 
that reflects error associated with the model after the independent variables are
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Table 22
Study 2: Logistic Regression Predicting High vs. Low Saving with Mental Accounting
Variables








Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald U Odds
Home 3.486 .221 249.79 (1) <.001 32.66
Number of accounts 0.469 .053 76.83 (1) <.001 1.60
Credit use -1.145 .124 84.63 (1) <.001 .318
Future asset/income 1.407 .200 49.54(1) <.001 4.08
Current asset/income 3.589 .546 43.20(1) <.001 36.20
Constant -3.73 .242 237.84
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Figure 2. Comparison o f initial and final mental accounting classifications.
Initial Mental Accounting Model (n=2,216): 
Observed Groups and Predicted Probabilities
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included was approximately cut in half by the mental accounting model -2LL = 897.5 
versus the life cycle model -2LL -  1,680.5. The results supported the conclusion that life 
cycle and mental accounting models were not equivalent.
Life Cycle and Mental Accounting Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that a model 
combining life cycle and mental accounting factors (14 variables) would improve the 
prediction of high and low savings beyond the level of either model alone. It was also 
expected that the life cycle variables would have the largest effects and precede the entry 
of mental accounting factors in stepwise models.
Table 23 displays the logistic regression results for the life cycle and mental 
accounting regression. When the combined mental accounting and life cycle binomial 
logistic regression was calculated, however, the improvement in predicting high versus 
low saving was marginal. Nine of the 14 variables met the forward conditional criteria of 
probability less than 0.05 and entered the model (in order of entry): home, accounts, 
credit use, future assets, shocks, age, current assets, bequest, income. Five variables (kids, 
expectation, precautionary, regular saving, saving estimate) were excluded.
The final prediction equation was Y = -4.56 +2.98 (home) + 0.283 (accounts) - 
0.833 (credit use) + 1.32 (future assets) -  0.732 (shocks) + 0.19 (age) + 3.41 (current 
assets) + 0.186 (bequest) + 0 (income). Holding the effect of income constant, having a 
home increased the odds of being high saving 19.7 times. The odds o f being high saving 
were also increased 1.3 times for each additional asset account, by 1.02 times for each 
year older and 1.2 times for each unit increase in the rating o f bequest importance.
Having a high current asset (30.5 times) and future asset (3.7 times) ratio also increased 
the odds o f being high saving. Every consumption shock decreased the odds ratios of
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Table 23
Study 2: Logistic Regression Predicting High vs. Low Saving with Life Cycle and Mental
Accounting Variables
Logit estimates Number of observations = 2216
L R x  (5) = 2276 .21
Log likelihood = 795.31
Pseudo = .856
Variable Coef. Std.:Err. Wald u. Odds
Home 2.981 .232 164.82(1) <.001 19.70
Number of accounts 0.283 .060 22.04 (1) <.001 1.33
Credit use -.833 .136 37.25 (1) <001 .435
Future asset/income 1.32 .196 45.31 (1) <001 3.74
Shocks -.732 .155 22.33 (1) <001 .481
Age .019 .006 8.26(1) <01 1.02
Current asset/income 3.42 .542 39.75 (1) <001 30.50
Bequest .186 .062 9.11(1) <01 1.20
Income .000 .000 16.99(1) <001 1.00
Constant -4.56 .435 109.99
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being high saving (-62%) as did credit use (-67%). As can be seen, the mental accounting 
factors (home, accounts, credit use, future assets) had the largest predictive effects and 
were entered on the first four steps of the model. The next two steps (shocks, age) were
'y
life cycle variables. The overall model was significant (x = 2,276.5 (5) p  <.001). The -2  
log likelihood measure o f error was 795.3 for the combined model. The goodness of fit 
test indicated a good fit for the nine factors (x = 9,226.7 (8), p  <.001). The classification 
plots displayed in Figure 3 indicated correct classification of 93.2% of low saving, 95.0% 
of high saving and an 94.1% overall correct classification. Table 24 summarizes the 
hypotheses and results from Study 2.
Finally, although not specifically hypothesized, the interviews in Study 1 and 
previous research (Hinz, McCarthy & Turner, 1997; Sunden & Surette, 1998) indicated 
the potential for individual differences by sex. This raised the question of how robust the 
findings would be if  the sample were divided into males and female groups. The 2,216 
high and low saving individuals were subsequently divided into male (1,671 or 75%) and 
female groups (545 or 25%), which corresponded approximately to the general 
proportion found in the overall sample (78% male, 22% female). An exploratory analysis 
for the life cycle and mental accounting model was rerun for males and females. As seen 
in Table 25 the results for males {F^ = .82; 93% correct classification) and females = 
.11 \ 92% correct classification) for mental accounting factors were comparable to the
• • • 9original mental accounting model (R = .83; 93% correct classification). However, as 
seen in Table 26, the life cycle model was affected by sex. Life cycle factors for males
9 9(R = .65; 86% correct classification) were similar to the life cycle model (R = .62; 85% 
correct classification), but differed from females (R^ =.28; 81% correct classification).
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Figure 3. Comparison of initial and final combined model classifications.
Initial Combined Model (n=2,216):
Observed Groups and Predicted Probabilities
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Table 24
Study 2: Summary o f  Hypotheses and Results
Hypothesis Result
H I: Life Cycle:
Life cycle factors would identify high / low saving Supported
H2: Mental Accounting:
Mental accounting factors would identify high / low saving Supported
H2: Life Cycle V5. Mental Accounting:
Life cycle and mental accounting models would differ significantly 
in identifying high / low saving Supported
H4: Life Cycle and Mental Accounting:
Combining life cycle and mental accounting models would improve 
identification of high / low saving Supported
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Table 25
Study 2: Logistic Regression Predicting High vs. Low Saving with Mental Accounting
Variables fo r  Males and Females
Male
Logit estimates Number of observations =1671
LR x^(5) = 1549.6
Log likelihood =714.5
Pseudo =.815
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald R Odds
Flome 3.49 .260 180.3 (1) P < .001 33.06
Number of accounts .427 .058 53.9(1) P < .001 1.53
Credit use -1.28 .147 76.3 (1) P < .001 .277
Future assets/income 1.46 .218 44.5(1) P < .001 4.29
Current assets/income 3.24 .579 31.3 (1) P < .001 25.55
Constant -3.31 .285 134.8
Female
Logit estimates Number of observations = 545
LR x^(4) =2276.21
Log likelihood =795.31
Pseudo R^ = .856
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald R Odds
Home 3.72 .410 82.3 (1) P < .001 41.19
Number of accounts .721 .128 31.5(1) P < .001 2.05
Credit use -1.18 .235 25.3 (1) P < .001 .307
Future assets/income 1.14 .523 4.78(1) P < .001 3.14
Constant -4.27 .459 86.52
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Table 26
Study 2: Logistic Regression Predicting High vs. Low Saving with Life Cycle Variables
fo r  Males and Females
Male








Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald R Odds
Age .079 .005 211.3 (1) /X.OOl 1.08
Shocks -1.13 .142 85.8(1) ;?<.001 0.26
Income .000 .000 81.8(1) p < .m 1.00
Bequest .203 .049 17.1(1) p<.Q5 1.13
Constant -4.89 .342 205.2(1)
Female
Logit estimates Number of observations = 545
L R x '(3 )  =112.4
Log likelihood = 474.6
Pseudo R^ = .283
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Wald R Odds Ratio
Age 0.064 0.007 86.4(1) p<.QQ\ 1.07
Shocks -0.71 0.175 16.3 (1) /7<.001 0.49
Bequest 0.225 0.079 8.1(1) p<.Q\ 1.25
Constant -4.58 0.475 92.8(1)
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Discussion
This study used a new saving index outeome measure and developed two 
theoretically based models (life cycle and mental accounting) to predict high versus low 
saving levels in the 2001 Survey o f Consumer Finances. The results indicated that 
variables generated from mental accounting psychology were very effective in predicting 
and classifying high and low saving individuals.
The saving index used in this study created saving groups that did not conform to 
the hump-shaped age and income profile predicted by life cycle economies. The 
normative life-cycle approach prescribed that saving corresponded to a rational allocation 
of wealth and income over time according to demographic factors. As a result, saving has 
been predominantly described as a function of demographics; demographic groups 
divided the sample first, then saving was measured. In contrast, the saving index did the 
reverse; relative saving levels divided the sample first, then characteristics associated 
with each saving level were measured. This procedure followed the descriptive 
psychological approach pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and extended by 
Thaler and Shefrin (1988). Observations o f behavior and saving anomalies have indicated 
that rational assumptions of maximizing consumption utility by age, income, wealth and 
demographies did not hold under many circumstances (Thaler, 1992). Furthermore, the 
factors used in decision making and saving models have moved away from objective 
factors or end states toward subjective perceptions of changes from one state to another. 
Thus, saving decisions were framed in relative and not objective terms (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984).
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The saving index ratio of actual to expected net worth provided a measure of 
savings relative to each individual. This approach was not restricted by age, income or 
other demographics. The saving index often paired individuals who were similar 
psychologically but very different demographically. For example, saving index scores of 
2.9 (actual net worth was 2.9 times expected net worth) were shared by the following 
high-saving SCF respondents:
• 88 year-old White widowed female with a high school degree and no children
earning $11,800/year
• 54 year-old Black married male with a college degree and one child earning
$277,000/year
• 40 year-old White married male with a college degree and three children
earning $7.9 million/year
Age, income, race, education, marital status or number of children would have placed 
most o f these individuals into separate groups even though their relative saving levels 
were equivalent. The saving index used in the current study extended research using ratio 
outcome variables to study saving (Bae, Flanna & Lindamood, 1997; Bernheim, Skinner 
& Weinberg, 1997; Hilgert, Hogarth & Beverly, 2003; Kennickell, 1999) and the saving 
index separated the sample into groups with significantly different saving levels and 
characteristics.
Both life cycle and mental accounting models described saving as a multivariate 
cognitive process with interdependent factors. When viewed as a cognitive process, both 
approaches implied different representations o f wealth evident in saving decisions and 
asset allocations. For the life cycle saver, wealth was fungible and pooled together. For
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the mental accounting saver, wealth was organized into separate accounts of income, 
current assets and future assets. The three predictive models compared saving outcomes 
associated with theoretical life cycle and mental accounting representations of wealth. 
The results indicated that SCF respondents treated components of their wealth differently 
and that asset categories had different effects in separating high and low saving as 
predicted by mental accounting.
The first regression model illustrated that the life cycle variables: age, bequest, 
children, future expectations, income and consumption shocks, significantly predicted 
high versus low saving on the saving index. Not surprisingly, the life cycle model 
detected significant demographic differences between high and low saving groups. In 
comparison with low saving, high saving people were significantly older and had higher 
incomes and fewer consumption shocks. Modigliani (1985) succinctly described this life 
cycle expectation in the case of a stationary economy, “the aggregate wealth-income 
ratio, W/Y, is given by the ratio of the sum of wealth held at each age” (p. 301). High 
saving people also had fewer children and felt bequests were more important which 
replicated life cycle trends found in other research (Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Deaton, 
1992; Kennickell, 1995, 2001).
The second regression model, however, provided support for mental accounting. 
The mental accounting variables: number of asset accounts, credit use, current asset to 
income ratio, future asset to income ratio and having a home, were strong predictors of 
being high or low on the saving index. High saving was associated with more asset 
accounts, higher future and current asset to income ratios as well as having a house and 
not using credit. Among the SCF participants, different asset categories had different
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effects in predieting saving levels. The successful mental aceounting saver was expected 
to be adept at transferring cash into categories that were less likely to be spent like 
current asset aceounts (checking, savings, money market), future assets (pension, thrift 
plan, IRA) or a home. The results indicated that the odds of being a member o f the high 
saving group were improved relative to the liquidity o f the asset. The value of illiquid 
assets like future pensions, thrift plans, IRAs increased proportionally between the 
bottom and top saving index quartiles.
As Shefrin and Thaler (1988) predicted, assets displayed different propensities to 
be consumed. Given that current assets are most likely to be consumed, a person with a 
higher current asset to income ratio was proportionally more likely to be high saving than 
a person with the same future asset to income ratio. In other words, the mental aeeounting 
model illustrated that it was more difficult to find people whose current asset to income 
ratio was high than it was to find people whose future asset to income ratio was high. In 
addition, the mental aceounting model indieated differences between high and low saving 
groups could be standardized and predicted using income as a subjective reference point 
instead of an absolute measure. This approach corresponded to prospect theory’s 
psychophysics o f choice that decisions were evaluated as a gain or loss from a subjeetive 
reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Finally, in contrast to life cycle predictions o f using debt to smooth consumption, 
high saving individuals were more debt averse than low saving individuals. High saving 
individuals self-restricted credit use (borrowed less than was possible or borrowed 
nothing at all) more often than low saving as Shefrin and Thaler (1988) predicted. The 
mental accounting model also provided evidence for a cognitive, heuristic process
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underlying the organization and accumulation of wealth. The asset account variable 
simply tallied the number of separate accounts or asset types (stocks, bonds, cds, etc.) 
into which wealth was allocated. High saving individuals demonstrated a greater 
expertise in creating and funding a larger network of asset accounts than low saving 
individuals. In a life cycle model, the number and labeling of asset accounts should not 
separate high and low saving individuals given that people pool income and assets to set 
a long term spending level. Overall, these findings contributed to a growing literature 
applying mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) and prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) in secondary analyses of nationwide data sets (e.g., Bernheim, Skinner & 
Weinberg, 1997; Chaulk, Johnson & Bulcroft, 2003).
Comparing the life cycle versus mental accounting results demonstrated that two 
models with a similar number o f predictors (7 each) differed significantly in their ability 
to identify high versus low saving individuals. Furthermore, when the life cycle and 
mental accounting models (14 variables) were combined, it did not greatly improve the 
prediction of high and low savings beyond the mental accounting model. Nine variables 
met the criteria for inclusion in the combined stepwise model. The first four were mental 
accounting variables (home, accounts, credit use and future assets). The life cycle 
variables entered the model on the fifth (shock), sixth (age) and ninth (income) steps. 
These results demonstrated mental accounting variables were viable predictors of high 
and low saving independent of life cycle factors like age and income. The final 
exploratory analysis also indicated the potential for sex differences and that female heads 
of households may evaluate saving decisions differently than male heads of households.
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Future research on the extent to which sex mediates or moderates saving decisions may 
be warranted.
A limitation for the quantitative analyses is that the Survey o f Consumer Finance 
is a cross-sectional survey and does not perform repeated measures on the same 
individuals over time. Different results may be obtained with a panel data set. This study 
was also limited by the fact that the study was not an experiment. The design and 
statistics showed correlation and allowed prediction, but could not be used to assess 
causation. The results have shown that mental accounting variables could be applied 
successfully in a predictive model of saving. Other potential explanations for these 
results, however, were not excluded by this experimental design.
Another potential limitation was that as a result o f how the variables were 
constructed, some predictor variables were partially related to the outcome variable 
(saving index: actual/expected net worth) for both the life cycle (income, age) and mental 
accounting (current assets / income, future assets / income) models. To some degree, 
interrelated variables reflect the nature of what is studied. Financial outcomes like saving 
are multivariate and depend upon the cumulative effects of many variables over time. As 
Kennickell (1999) noted in research using the SCF, finding one variable that accounted 
for most of the variance exclusively was more difficult than finding many variables that 
accounted for some variance in combination with many others. Economists have 
described this problem in terms of endogenous variables (value of variable depends upon 
other variables) and exogeneous variables (value of variable is independent of other 
variables). Economic and psychological research design has adapted to fit these
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constraints accordingly. The research question o f this study was articulated with the 
partially endogenous nature of saving predictors and outcomes in mind.
The life cycle and mental accounting models outlined a cognitive process for 
making saving decisions and accumulating wealth. Studies using these models have 
generally gauged the extent to which the model fit and organized empirical data. For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky primarily used demonstrations to illustrate prospect 
theory’s effects in the decision making process. Prospect theory consistently described, 
predicted and explained the outcomes of the demonstrations (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, 1984, 2000). Similarly, the question for this study was not whether predictor and 
outcome variables were interrelated. The question was whether variables specified by 
mental accounting and life cycle theories were interrelated as the theories would predict 
and how useful each variable would be in identifying members of high saving and low 
saving groups.
The analysis, design and variables used in Study 2 reflected this research 
question. Nonparametric statistics that would not violate a linear model’s assumptions 
were used. An ordinary least squares regression would assume that predictors and 
outcomes are independent to determine whether a change in a predictor produced a 
corresponding linear change in an outcome. In contrast, logistic regression generates a 
maximum likelihood estimate of the probability for a certain binomial outcome (0,1) to 
occur. Logistic regression calculates the changes in the log odds o f the dependent, not 
changes in the dependent itself as linear regression would. Thus, many assumptions of 
linear regression (linearity, normal distributions and homoscedasticity) for the variables 
did not apply for this analysis. For example, the SCF data accurately reflected the skew
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of income and wealth (Kennickell, 2001), but given the rank order nature o f the saving 
index quartiles and that logistic regression measured changes in odds and not variables, it 
was not necessary to transform income to perform the analysis. The rank orders of 
income, log of income and the square root of income would be equivalent. The saving 
index was also not comprised of a single variable. The saving index was a ratio of actual 
net worth less inheritance relative to expected net worth for one’s age and income. 
Converting variables into ratios, counts, dummy codes (0,1) and rank orders standardized 
measures and made individuals at different ends o f the income and wealth spectrum 
comparable.
Although an asset-based predictor and an asset-based outcome appear 
tautological, the mental accounting model’s results indicated very different odds ratios by 
type of asset. Despite being asset-based measures, the ratio of asset values relative to 
income (current assets, future assets), the number of asset accounts and having a house all 
had different effects in separating high and low savers. People appeared to label and treat 
assets differently instead of treating assets as fungible. Overall, asking people for current 
and future asset ratios relative to income, the number o f asset accounts, if  they own a 
home and if they use credit was a very effective classification strategy. Mental 
accounting predicted these asset allocations and this strategy would not have been 
suggested by a life cycle account. However, the observed relations may be inflated due to 
overlapping components among independent and dependent measures. Future research 
may provide additional mental accounting independent variables with less overlap with 
dependent measures decreasing the possibility of inflated values due to part/whole 
correlation.
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The models tested were incomplete representations of the theory. The variables 
selected had to meet competing demands. Not only did the variables need to have a basis 
in the theory, but they also had to have been measured in the data set. Again, the use of 
proxy variables such as counting the number of separate asset accounts as opposed to 
calculating the sums o f money deposited in each served as a good indicator. The models 
tested also were incomplete representations o f all possible variables that could possibly 
have had an effect on saving such as receiving an inheritance, getting professional advice, 
sex, race and so forth. As noted earlier, the exception in multivariate, nationwide survey 
research with large samples were the variables that did not have some effect on saving. 
Therefore, selecting model components was more an exercise o f exclusion than inclusion.
Each variable selected had either been used in previous saving research, was tied 
explicitly to either the life cycle or mental accounting theories, or was specified in 
qualitative interviews in Study 1 (e.g., a house was an important separate asset that was 
treated differently). The models that resulted from theoretically selected variables were 
parsimonious and contained fairly good predictors of high and low saving (greater than 
85% correct classification of cases and relatively high proportions o f variance accounted 
for). However, it can be argued that assignment of a variable to one model or the other 
depended upon an arbitrary interpretation o f the life cycle or mental accounting approach. 
In other words, certain factors could be placed into either model. Future research could 
refine the application of mental accounting concepts to selecting predictor variables in 
national datasets. Additional basic research on the underlying structure and relations 
among the variables is obviously required.
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A final potential limitation of this study was that the comparison was restricted 
only to low and high saving groups. Given the exploratory nature o f the mental 
accounting variables and that small incremental effects beyond age and income were 
expected, only the top and bottom quartile were tested instead o f the whole sample to 
increase the chances o f detecting a difference. While comparing only the top and bottom 
quartiles may be perceived as a limitation, Carroll (1998) has argued that focusing on the 
saving of the wealthy is a sound analytic strategy:
The saving behavior of the wealthy has received remarkably little academic 
attention in the past twenty years or so .. .Despite recent neglect, the topic is an 
important one for scholars of saving behavior, for at least two reasons. First, 
wealthy households should provide a powerful means of testing whether the 
standard model of consumer behavior, the Life Cycle/Permanent Income 
Hypothesis, is adequate as a universal model o f saving and consumption. This is 
an application of the general scientific principle that models should be tested 
under extreme conditions; if  they do not hold up, a new model (or an extended 
version of the old one) is called for. The second reason for studying the wealthy is 
that they account for a large share of aggregate wealth. In fact, some 
understanding of the saving behavior of the wealthy is probably indispensable to 
any credible attempt to account for the magnitude of aggregate wealth (p. I) 
Future research may apply mental accounting variables to predict saving in the entire 
sample.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
American saving levels vary widely. At one end of the continuum is a minority 
who successfully save and at the other end, a majority who save very little (Attanasio, 
1994; Browning & Lusardi, 1996). Americans are not alone. Many other countries have 
similar distributions of saving and wealth accumulation (Schmidt-Hebbel & Serven, 
1999). The primary question for this research, then, was what variables ean be used to 
aceurately predict high saving versus low saving? The economic answer was that people 
rationally smooth wealth consumption to a constant level over time (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954). Thaler (1992) reduced the economic life cycle hypothesis to an annuity 
of total wealth divided by expeeted years left to live. Stated this way, the saving 
continuum primarily depends on demographics (wealth and position in the life-cycle). To 
date, most Ameriean data sets (e.g., Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Survey of 
Consumer Finances, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Survey of Investment Program 
Participation, etc.) were primarily split, tested and reported according to demographic 
variables even though there was data collected on attitudes, behaviors and other factors. 
Life-cycle assumptions dominated how saving was reported and how saving groups were 
formed. In eomparison to saving, product marketing incorporated a wide array of 
psychological and other faetors to effectively target consumers and influence behavior 
(Kotler, 1997). While the psychology of spending is highly evolved, the psychology of 
saving is comparatively embryonic. This research was designed to increase the
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understanding of high and low saving levels with coneepts generated from mental 
accounting psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).
The movement toward psychological variables in both decision making and 
saving has been a meta-trend. Theories o f decision making began with expected value in 
the early 1700s and developed later into expeeted utility. Rational models for maximizing 
expected utility were developed (Von Neumarm & Morgenstem, 1947) and subsequently 
challenged by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory (Gigerenzer et ah, 1993; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lopes, 1994). Decision making theory has progressed from 
objective variables that were rationally and economically evaluated toward subjective 
variables that were heuristieally and psychologically evaluated. The assumptions 
underlying decision making were subsequently applied to understand and predict saving. 
Economic life cycle models of saving (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) assumed a rational 
agent maximizing utility by evaluating life cycle factors (age, income, future 
expectations, et al.) to make spend / save decisions. In contrast, psychological mental 
accounting models (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) of saving assumed a cognitive miser using 
heuristics to make save / spend decisions that often appear irrational. The results of both 
studies presented here provided new evidence that saving decisions were not experienced 
as a rational life-cycle assessment of wealth and that mental accounting significantly 
distinguished high and low saving individuals.
The qualitative results o f Study 1 generally supported the mental accounting 
approach to saving. The 24 participants indicated that saving was largely self-taught, 
experience-based and heuristic. Respondents reported that attributional processes, 
emotional responses to events, learning and adult development influenced their saving.
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Saving was not described in life cyele terms as a rational agent assessing wealth and 
future expectations to set a long-term spending level. Most approaches to saving were 
relatively uncomplicated and geared to provide short-term control of spending (automatic 
payroll deduction, separate accounts, paying one-self first, etc.). Life cycle saving 
motives like bequests and precautionary saving also were not prominent in people’s 
explanations of how and why they saved. This study extended the findings of Kennickell, 
Starr-McClure, & Sunden, (1996) and offered an additional qualitative perspective on 
saving that supported mental accounting (Thaler, 1999). Despite being infrequently 
applied, smaller scale qualitative research greatly enhanced the findings and illustrated 
the value o f a multi-method measurement approach to saving (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Future exploratory research on mental accounting heuristics, strategies and influential 
factors may profit from including a qualitative pre-test.
For example. Study 1 suggested some new factors that were not explicit in the life 
cycle or mental accounting studies. Participants mentioned that their saving was often 
strongly motivated by an ethical or moral component. Many participants felt saving was 
a social duty to prevent dependence upon others. Others felt a religious or spiritual 
responsibility not to waste what one is given. Still others described their saving ethic in 
environmental terms; conserving resources saves money and assures others can enjoy 
them in the future. The presence of a saving ethic was strong and pervasive. An 
individual’s saving ethic did not necessarily fit into Keynes’ (1936) motives, Modigliani 
and Brumberg’s (1954) life cycle hypothesis nor the mental accounting theory (Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1988). It may in fact correspond to earlier ideas on the psychology of saving 
proposed by Katona (1951, 1975) regarding willingness to save. Etzioni (2003) has also
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proposed a new socio-eeonomic view that people are not just motivated by the invisible 
hand of self-interest or greed and that many economic motivations also stem from a sense 
of moral duty. Future research may include variables that test the level of importance 
attached to saving and the extent to which this is influenced by an individual’s moral or 
ethical motivation.
In contrast, Study 2 presented quantitative evidence that new variables based upon 
mental accounting theory could successfully predict high versus low saving in the 
nationwide 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. The addition of new variables to predict 
and explain saving variation was significant. As Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (1997) 
have noted, heterogeneous variation in saving is to be expected, but:
... the interpretation of this variation is of paramount importance. If one 
takes the view that saving reflects rational, farsighted optimization, then low 
savers are simply expressing their preferences for current consumption over future 
consumption -  one cannot coherently claim that they are saving “too little” ... any 
more than one can assert that people would be better off if  they spent more time 
listening to classical music. However, if  one takes the view that households are 
shortsighted, irrational, prone to regret, or heavily influenced by psychological 
motives, then the adequacy of saving among various population subgroups 
emerges as an important and potentially well-posed empirical question 
(Bernheim, Skinner & Weinberg, 1997, 1).
The results of Study 2 contributed to a growing body o f literature indicating mental 
accounting effects in large data sets. The strength of the asset account variable 
demonstrated that people who tended to create and maintain a larger and more intricate
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network of asset accounts tended to have higher savings. These results corresponded with 
Hilgert, Hogarth & Sandra’s (2003) findings that people with higher knowledge about the 
process of saving were more likely to be in a high saving group. Also, in a life-cycle 
model, households should pool assets and make saving and investment decisions 
simultaneously to optimize their life resources. Chen, Hanna and Montalto (1998) 
demonstrated no significant interrelation between household saving decisions and 
portfolio allocation decisions. Similarly, in Study 2, the strength o f the asset accounts 
variable provided further evidence that people maintain separate accounts and make 
separate decisions about these accounts supporting the mental accounting approach to 
saving.
As Shefrin and Thaler (1988) observed in their model o f mental accounting, the 
key to saving is transferring income into less liquid current asset and future income 
accounts where it is less likely to be spent. This aspect of the mental accounting model 
was strongly supported by the current assets/income, future assets/income indicator and 
home variables. People’s overall net worth as measured by the saving index (which 
scaled for debt, inheritance, age and income) clearly demonstrated households who were 
high saving were very proficient at converting income into less liquid assets and self- 
restricting the use of credit/debt as would be expected by mental accounting theory. This 
formula for saving success was not limited to the wealthy or to people o f a certain age. 
Creating a saving index that gauged the proportion of actual net worth to expected net 
worth, created groups o f savers who were psychologically similar but demographically 
different. Mental accounting variables consistently separated these diverse groups. The 
effectiveness of the mental accounting predictive model, while very good in classifying
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high versus low saving, was not absolute. At the extreme high and low ends of saving, 
there was considerable variation and some threshold effects (e.g., a certain level of 
income). Trimming these extreme groups in future analyses may temper the model and 
provide better estimation for the middle groups not examined in this study.
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) illustrated a psychophysics of 
chance and choice derived from a relative reference point. Using current income as a 
reference point as suggested by Thaler (1999a) also provided insight to what separated 
high from low saving levels. Each of the saving index quartiles displayed significant 
differences on variables using income as the denominator in financial ratios. This 
reaffirmed psychological research indicating people’s status quo provides a primary 
reference for framing subsequent saving or spending decisions (Kahneman, 2002).
Mental accounting (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposed a cognitive ledger for wealth with 
different propensities to consume depending on account. The mental accounting variables 
based upon an income, current asset and future asset account framework provided a 
practical means for measuring and predicting high saving levels versus low saving levels. 
In sum, the results of both studies supported the use o f prospect theory and mental 
accounting to better understand saving behavior.
An implication o f this research is the value of an interdisciplinary approach. 
Psychologists and economists willing to go beyond the traditional boundaries o f their 
disciplines have made significant contributions that are now being recognized. 
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel memorial prize in 
economics “for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic 
science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty”.
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Kahneman’s (2002) Nobel lecture provides a psychological framework for decision 
making and concludes that such a framework “can be useful if  it guides a principled 
search for analogies across domains, to identify common processes and to prevent overly 
narrow interpretations of findings.” (p. 483). Interdisciplinary psychology and economic 
studies that once were the exception may soon become the rule.
Another implication of this research is that mental accounting differences between 
high and low saving groups may help explain the limited success of saving initiatives. 
Groups formed by the saving index in Study 2 contrasted sharply to the age-based groups 
proposed by the Department of Labor’s 2002 National Summit on Retirement Savings 
(Millennials, Generation X, Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation) and other studies 
that classified saving groups (AARP, 1999; Campbell & Mankiw, 1991; Weil, 1991). 
Browning and Lusardi (1996) after reviewing the saving literature concluded that the vast 
majority of Americans arrive at retirement age with no savings. Furthermore, employers 
have cut pensions and retirement benefits, so people increasingly need to plan their own 
retirements. National saving policies and the efforts of private associations to improve 
saving are predicated upon understanding saving variation and correctly classifying 
individuals into meaningful groups. These efforts may benefit greatly by incorporating 
mental accounting. For example. Thaler (1994) has observed that some recent 
government programs that improve saving such as 40Iks, apply mental accounting 
principles like automating decisions, rewarding saving and reducing the need for self- 
control.
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Psychologically enhanced saving programs and educational initiatives have a 
nationwide value. Deaton (1999), in reviewing the relationship between savings and 
growth, notes:
Most governments and policy makers appear to regard growth as a good thing per 
se. A necessary (but certainly not sufficient) condition for growth is investment, 
in machines, in people, or in both. In a closed economy, these investments can 
come only from postponing consumption, that is from saving. ... If so, it is a short 
step to the conclusion that saving drives growth, and that the appropriate policies 
for growth are those that promote saving (p.33)
Therefore, expanded application of mental accounting may provide better understanding 
of individual differences in saving and yield more effective financial education. Mental 
accounting measures of saving are also well suited for self-diagnosis and comparison 
with others. Within every demographic group there is variability in saving. People can 
gauge what separates them from similar others who save more or save less using a few 
simple measures.
In conclusion, a growing body of evidence across studies, disciplines and nations 
has indicated saving and wealth accumulation are strongly influenced by an individual’s 
choices and reflect a cognitive decision process. Behavioral science, though, has yet to 
overcome many myths about saving and wealth accumulation. Many people assume 
economic outcomes are predestined. Regardless of individual choices, wealth is actually 
an inevitable result of ancestry, inheritance, luck, income, age, education, government 
policy, profession or social status. Causal assumptions about wealth manifest themselves 
in overgeneralizations such as low-income households never save and high-income
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households always save which researchers must address (e.g., Carroll, 1998; Sherraden, 
M. & Beverly, S.G. 2000).
However, continued research on saving and wealth accumulation may help to 
dispel many misconceptions. For example, Stanley and Danko (1996) discovered that real 
millionaires (net worth in excess of $1 million) did not fit existing stereotypes:
Most people have it all wrong about wealth in America. Wealth is not the same as 
income. If you make a good income each year and spend it all, you are not getting 
wealthier... Wealth is what you accumulate, not what you spend. How do you 
become wealthy? Here, too, most people have it wrong. It is seldom luck or 
inheritance or advanced degrees or even intelligence that enables people to amass 
fortunes. Wealth is more often the result of a lifestyle o f hard work, perseverance, 
planning, and, most of all, self-discipline (Stanley & Danko, 1996, p i).
Counter to commonly held beliefs, for 80% of millionaires, wealth was self-made in one 
generation without an inheritance or lucky windfall. Most millionaires lived well below 
their means and heuristieally created “an environment of economic scarcity” that 
provided self-control to minimize spending and debt. Millionaires also displayed 
expertise at converting income into separate asset accounts that were less liquid and less 
likely to be spent. For Stanley and Danko (1996), wealth was the result of a lifestyle and 
decision making process. These findings resonate with many elements o f Shefrin and 
Thaler’s (1988) mental accounting theory of saving.
The proposition that wealth accumulation is related to a lifestyle and decision 
making process is also reminiscent of Banfield’s (1968) time-horizon theory and 
description of social classes. In analyzing the problems of urban development, Banfield
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(1968) observed that many of the distinet patterns associated with upper and lower 
classes stemmed from sharing a similar psychological orientation to the future. Lower 
classes were observed to be present oriented and upper classes future oriented. 
Interestingly, Banfield (1968) notes:
The reader is asked to keep in mind that members of a “class” as the word is used 
here are people who share a “distinct patterning of attitudes, values, and modes of 
behavior,” not people of like income, occupation, schooling or status, (p. 56) 
Banfield (1968) concluded that class membership reflected subjective psychology more 
than objective demographics and that the lower, working, middle and upper classes were 
tied to a time horizon that was socially transferred.
Perhaps, as mental accounting is disseminated as a process for understanding 
saving decisions and wealth accumulation, the paradigm for gauging fiscal fitness will 
change. For example, financial planners now incorporate a client’s personal risk tolerance 
and are asking fewer demographic questions. A new psychological vocabulary 
surrounding saving decisions has emerged, and, as Thaler (1999b) has observed, it may 
soon be redundant to say behavioral finance or behavioral economics because there will 
be no other kind.
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The purpose o f this research is to examine how people make decisions to save for the future. Any findings 
of this study will be used to help improve individuals’ ability to save.
Description:
You will be asked to participate in a personal interview lasting approximately 45 minutes with 22 questions 
regarding your views on saving. Of interest is how you approach saving decisions. There are no wrong or 
right answers. Your responses will be tape-recorded to ensure an impartial and accurate record. To maintain 
anonymity and confidentiality no information that identifies you (name, address, phone, etc.) will be 
collected nor stored with data -  all interviews will be referenced with a case number. The recordings will 
be converted to a CD and the answers coded into a spreadsheet for analysis. This CD and spreadsheet will 
be kept by the researcher for 5 years per guidelines o f the American Psychological Association and not 
shared. No personal risks or discomforts are anticipated in answering these questions, and you can 
discontinue participation at any time. In return for assisting in this research, a personal comparison o f your 
responses versus responses o f American averages will be provided.
Other Elements:
You understand that the use o f human subjects has been approved by the University of New Hampshire 
(UNH) Institutional Review Board for the protection o f subjects in research.
You understand the scope, aims, and purposes o f this research project and the procedures to be followed 
and the expected duration of your participation.
You understand that your consent to participate in this research is entirely voluntary, and that your refusal 
to participate will involve no prejudice, penalty or loss o f benefits to which you would otherwise be 
entitled.
You further understand that if you consent to participate, you may discontinue your participation in this 
research project.
You understand that you will not be provided financial incentive for your participation by UNH.
You confirm that no coercion of any kind was used in seeking your participation in this research project.
You understand that any information gained about you as a result o f your participation will be provided to 
you at the conclusion of your involvement in this research project.
You certify that you have read and fully understand the purpose o f this research project and the risks and 
benefits it presents to you as stated above.
I , ____________________________________________ CONSENT/AGREE to participate
Print name
I , ____________________________________________ REFUSE/DO NOT AGREE to participate
P r i n t  n a m e
Signature Date
Questions:
Any questions or concerns regarding the research can be addressed to the researcher Thomas Van De Water. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a subject participating in this project, you may call Julie Simpson at the Office of Sponsored Research, 
phone 603-862-2003 for information.
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Appendix B
PERSONAL SA VING INTERVIEW
Thanks fo r agreeing to participate. Before we get started, could I  get a little personal information! Please 
complete this section that will be used to create your savings profile by choosing one option or filling in the 
blank.
1. Which best describes your saving habits 1) don’t save — usually spend more than income, 2) don’t save 
spend as much as income, 3) save whatever is left over at the end o f the month -  no regular plan, 4) 
save income o f one family member, spend the other, 5) spend regular income, save other income, 6) 
save regularly by putting money aside each month
2. Last year, would you say that your spending was 1) less than, 2) equal to, or 3) more than your 
income?
3. When planning your savings and investments, what type o f  time horizon do you have? 1) next year, 2) 
next few  years, 3) next 5-10 years, 4) longer than 10 years
4. Which best describes the amount o f  riskyou are willing to take when you save or make investments? I) 
substantial risks, 2) above-average risk, 3) average risk, 4) no financial risks
5. Compared with other people o f  my generation and background, I have been lucky in my financial 
affairs. I) agree strongly, 2) agree somewhat, 3) neither agree or disagree, 4) disagree somewhat, 5) 
disagree strongly
6. What is your age? _______________________
7. What is your occupation? _______________________
8. What is your gender? 1) male, 2) female
The rest o f  the interview consists o f  discussion questions regarding your views on saving.
9. What do you think o f  when I say “saving"?
a. Is saving the same as investing — why or why not?
b. Is saving something that is: internal/external, stable/unstable, 
controllable/uncontrollable?
10. Thinking about your reasons fo r saving, what sorts o f  reasons are most important to you?
11. Do you feel any moral or ethical obligation to save? “waste not want not” “neither a borrower nor 
lender be”
a. Why or why not?
12. In your view, why do some people save while others do not save?
13. What are some o f the things you have savedfor in the past?
14. What types offinancial obligations do you see in the future?
a. Are you saving fo r these expenses now? 1) yes, 2) no
15. Would you say that you deliberately plan your savings and investments, or do you make decisions as 
specific needs or opportunities arise?
16. Can you describe any strategies to put aside money fo r your saving goals?
a. Where did you learn them?
b. Why do you think they work?
17. What aspects o f  your circumstances, experience or personality infiuenceyour ability to save? 
(Depression, Frugal Yankee)
18. When planning your savings & investments, how does risk affect your decisions?
a. What types o f  risk are you concerned about?
19. How has your approach to saving changed over time?
20. What events or experiences have made you change your approach?
21. When you make decisions about your savings and investments, what sources o f  information do you 
consult?
22. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about your views on saving?
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Appendix C 
Institutional Review Board Approval
University of New Hampshire 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Suig'ects in Research 
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Clarification Sheet




 __________________________  Revimwen _______
Exempt Review
46.101(b)(1) Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal 
educational practices, such as;
  (i) research on regular or spedat educational InstnictiQnalstrategtes, or







Research Involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, inten/lew procedures or observation of public behavior unlera:
(0 information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or 
through identifiers linked to  the subjects; and
(ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the ^research could reasonably place the 
subjects a t risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to subjecte' financial standing, employability, or 
reputation.
R e ^ rc h  involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, interview procedures or obsavation of pubitc behavior that is not exempt uncier category 
(b)(2) if:
(0 the human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or 
(ii) federal statube(s) require(s) without exception that confidentiality of the personally identifiable 
information will t)e maintained throughout the research and thereafter.
Research involving the coifection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, 
or diagnostic spedmens, if these sources are publidy available or if the information is recorded by the 
inv«tigatpr in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to 
the subjects.
Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or 
agency heads, and which are ctesigned to  study, evaluate, or otherwise ecamine: (i) public trenefS: or 
service programs; (n) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (iii) peb b le  
changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or levels 
of payment for benefits or services under those programs.
Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (I) if wholesome foods without 
additives are consumed or (ii) or if a food is consumed that contairrs a food ingredient a t  or below the 
. level and fiar a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant a t or below 
. the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration, or approved by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Protocol is approved as presented in the category checked
Protocol is approved with the following contingeiMdes/comments (attach sheets If necessary) 
Protocol Is referred to the IRB for Expedited or Full Board review 
Protocol cannot be ap^oved as presented (cite reasons on separate sheet)
DRC Reviewen
w i i a v | # a i w a ia v s v t . /  a
: £/o W
152
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
